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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the world rejoiced as the fall of the Berlin Wall marked
the end of an era of oppression for much of Eastern Europe. In the
ensuing years, staggering changes have taken place in many areas of
the world-the institution of market economics, free expression of
speech, and open tolerance of religion. The most significant
improvement-the prize for which the people of East Germany,
Poland and the Soviet Union so valiantly strived-has been the
proliferation of the right of self-determination, the freedom to shape
one's own destiny, the ability to take part in the process of govern-
ment. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in the
seminal case of Wesberry v. Sanders, "[n]o right is more precious in a
free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who
make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined."'
In a representative democracy, the various political, economic
and social rights guaranteed by the constitution or laws of the land
are necessarily subject to the alteration or interpretation of a
governing authority.2 Therefore, the manner in which the gov-
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"This is a wonderful thought to keep in mind all the way around the course ....
Take dead aim .... refuse to allow any negative thought to enter your head, and
swing away." HARVEY PENICK ET AL., HARVEY PENICK'S LITrLE RED BOOK: LESSONS AND
TEACHINGS FORM A LIFETIME OF GOLF 45 (1992).
1 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
2 But see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 65-68 (2d ed. 1980)
(asserting that implementation as well as creation of statutes affects policy because of
(353)
354 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145:353
erning authority ascertains and effectuates the will of the people
ultimately determines the substance of the nation's legal framework
and consequently, the nature of society. Accordingly, the most
fundamental rights in such a system are those associated with the
right to vote.' As James Madison stated in 1787, "[t]he genius of
republican liberty [is] not only that all power should be derived from
the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in depen-
dence on the people."4
Ironically, as many countries taking their first precious steps
toward a freer society look to the United States as the prototypical
modem democracy, American government seems to have stumbled.
Decades of scandal have undermined the authority of government,
and a general feeling of discontent with Washington insiders has
become commonplace. In response, many Americans have increas-
ingly looked to "new faces" for political solutions. The independent
candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992, the strong public support for Gener-
al Colin Powell's candidacy in 1995, and the resiliency of Perot's
incomplete specification, conflicting directives, and the limited competence of
bureaucrats to effectuate legislative objectives); THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF
LIBERALISM 106 (2d ed. 1979) (commenting that the elected government has
abdicated much control to the bureaucracy as "modern law has become a series of
instructions to administrators rather than a series of commands to citizens").
Additionally, nonelected partisan officials carry out many functions of the governing
authority. Nevertheless, while elected officials do not maintain exclusive control over
government functions, their ability to control the legislative agenda and their ultimate
responsibility to the people ensure a minimum of popular control. See, e.g., LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451 (2d ed. 1988) (observing the
"Madisonian ideal of law as the expression of a general public good").
3 See ALEXANDER J. BOTT, HANDBOOK OF UNITED STATES ELECTION LAWS AND
PRAcTICES at xix (1990) (finding that "[tihe civil rights most basic to citizens of a
democracy are the political rights to vote, gain ballot access, criticize the government
in public, form political parties, and be kept informed of the government's activities");
Note, Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1975) (stating
that "[n]o institution is more central to the United States' system of representative
democracy than the election"); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the
Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 1997) (stating that "[t] o a degree unmatched in other
areas, judicial and legislative actions affecting the right to vote may have immediate
and decisive impacts on the nation's public life"); see also infra notes 47-49 and
accompanying text (describing in greater detail the constituent elements of the right
to vote).
4 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1 Many scholars recognize that episodes such as Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair,
the savings and loan scandal, and Whitewater have a cumulatively disparaging impact
on citizens' view of American government. Cf RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 95-97 (1960) (suggesting that the public perception of the office of president
changes over time).
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Reform Party are testaments to the pervasiveness and legitimacy of
the dissatisfaction with the existing political choices that many
Americans experience. 6  Nevertheless, these challengers to the
"existing order" have encountered substantial difficulty and expense
in attempting to place their names on ballots. Thus, the courts
recently have faced an increasing number of challenges to state
election schemes and have addressed the validity of many ballot
access restrictions.
Ballot access restrictions represent the organizational embodi-
ment of the dyad between representation and governability. As a
functional matter, a modicum of procedural regulation must exist in
order to ensure the fair and efficient administration of elections. In
addition, states have found it necessary to regulate the substance of
elections for a number of reasons, such as preventing voter confu-
sion, protecting the integrity of the two-party system, and maintaining
the stability of the political process. Beyond these stated objectives
however, majority parties have also found it politically expedient to
utilize ballot access restrictions as a method of warding off unwanted
competition.
In 1968, the Supreme Court began to address the constitutional-
ity of state-imposed restrictions on access to the ballot for indepen-
dent and third party candidates. In Williams v. Rhodes, the Court
found unconstitutional an Ohio election code which "made it
virtually impossible for a new political party.., to be placed on the
state ballot."7 Unfortunately, in the ensuing three decades the
Court's jurisprudence in this area has become riddled with inconsis-
tencies and vague standards of review, leaving Lawrence Tribe to
remark on "the doctrinal enigmas that bedevil the law of ballot
access," and to conclude that the "Court's initial forays into the
realm of access requirements were oblique and not wholly consis-
tent."8 The Court's failure to act decisively and consistently in this
6 For an example of the dissatisfaction with current political alternatives, see Future
of Amencan Politics (C-SPAN television broadcastJan. 8, 1995). David Kozak, a public
policy professor at Gannon University, observed that poll data collected in 1995 while
Ross Perot was hosting a political conference in Dallas, showed that greater than 60%
of the American electorate wanted a third political party; greater than 50% wanted
General Colin Powell or another independent candidate to run for the presidency in
1996; approximately 39% classified themselves as independents; and that the "floating
vote" had recently increased from 20% to between 30% and 40%. In sum, Mr. Kozak
observed that it was "a time of great fluidity, volatility, shifting sands" in the political
landscape. Id.
7 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968).
8 TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1102.
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area of the law has left lower courts without adequate guidance to
determine future constitutional challenges and has resulted in a
deterioration of states' confidence in the validity of their election
schemes. In order to maintain a properly functioning electoral
process, the Court must establish a clear standard of review for ballot
access restrictions that is consistent with its other constitutional
jurisprudence.
This Comment will argue that as long as the Court continues to
analyze alleged violations of equal protection and substantive due
process within the framework of tiered scrutiny, it must also consider
the constitutional validity of ballot access restrictions within this
framework. Further, because access restrictions necessarily implicate
the freedom of political association and the right to vote-both of
which the Court has affirmatively accepted as fundamental in charac-
ter-such regulations must be examined through the lens of strict
scrutiny. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n] o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall.., deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."9
These prohibitions are commonly referred to, respectively, as the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses respectively. Alleged
violations are generally reviewed under a system of "tiered" scrutiny:
a) rational basis-the Court will uphold state classifications that are
not based on a "suspect" classification and do not impair a "funda-
mental right" so long as the classification bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate government objective; 0 b) mid-level scrutiny--the
Court has required that "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives"; c) strict scrutiny-the Court
will only uphold state regulations that impinge on "fundamental"
rights or classifications that are based on "suspect" classifications if
such restrictions are "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."1 2 As the Court created strict scrutiny to protect funda-
9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("Unless a
classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the
constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classifica-
tion challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
n Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny
and referring to race as a "suspect" class); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
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mental rights, it is logically inconsistent and intuitively unreasonable
for the Court to deny this heightened scrutiny to two of our "most
precious freedoms."'" The Court must therefore employ a strict
scrutiny analysis that both recognizes the fundamental nature of the
individual rights infringed and enables states to effectively regulate
the electoral process.
Part I of this Comment will briefly illustrate the evolution of and
statutory response to the electoral system in the United States in
order to place the later discussion concerning modem ballot access
restrictions in the appropriate context. Part II will present the basic
constitutional parameters that empower the states to regulate ballot
access and through which the Court must view the validity of such
regulations.
Part III will trace the jurisprudential history of ballot access
restrictions, conclusively demonstrating the capriciousness of the
Court's decisions. As this Section will show, the Court has failed to
articulate a consistent analytical standard with which to evaluate state
ballot access restrictions, appearing instead to rely on distinct stan-
dards in each case. 4 The result of the Court's lack of logical consis-
tency has been a dearth of reliable precedent to guide lower courts
in their evaluation of election law, and an inability on the part of
states to proactively construct election schemes with any degree of
confidence in the constitutional viability of their efforts.
(using strict scrutiny to stike a race-based law). But cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417,
2417 (1996) (asserting that strict scrutiny is an inadequate mechanism by which to
protect content-based restrictions on fully protected speech). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 2, at 1451-54; Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577,
591 (1993) ("Courts often make decisions about whether to trump government action
with a thumb on the side of the scale that represents the will of the ostensibly
majoritarian branches. This is true... of any form of tiered review, such as that used
for equal protection and substantive due process claims."). For a satirical overview of
the Court's use of tiered scrutiny, see United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2292
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court's "current equal-protection
jurisprudence, which regards this Court as free to evaluate everything under the sun
by applying one of three tests: 'rational basis' scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or strict
scrutiny").
's Williams, 393 U.S. at 30.
,4 See Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and the Ballot Box: Supreme CourtJurisprudence
and Ballot Access for Independent Candidates, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 281, 282 (1993)
(discussing the widely-held view that the Court relied "on a different standard from
one ballot access case to the next"); Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballot-
Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 186-87 (1991)
(noting that the Supreme Court has applied rigorous strict scrutiny as well as minimal
scrutiny).
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Part IV will examine recent circuit and district court opinions as
conclusive evidence of the utter confusion in the lower courts regard-
ing the proper method of analysis for constitutional challenges to
ballot access restrictions.
Part V proposes an approach to analyzing constitutional challeng-
es to state ballot access restrictions. This Part argues that assuming
that the Court will continue to analyze alleged violations of equal
protection and substantive due process within the framework of
tiered scrutiny, the Court must examine all ballot access restrictions
through the lens of strict scrutiny. Utilizing a genuine and noncon-
clusory tiered-scrutiny analysis that accords appropriate weight to
both the states' objectives in regulating the ballot and the individual
constitutional interests infringed will enable courts to strike state
election schemes that unduly restrict the fundamental and precious
freedoms of association and voting without "t[ying] the hands" of
state legislatures that wish to regulate the ballot.15
I. HISTORY AND RATIONALE FOR BALLOT ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
As a purely functional matter, a fundamental level of regulation
in the election of public officials must exist. Thus, in 1974 Justice
White observed in Storer v. Brown that "as a practical matter, there
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany
the democratic processes." " Nevertheless, although the establish-
ment of a procedural context for the electoral process is undeniably
essential to the orderly operation of a free society, in the modem era
all states have developed far more extensive sets of regulations to
govern the various aspects of the voting mechanism. A full under-
standing of the modern jurisprudential response to ballot access
11 SeeBurdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). Asserting that all election laws
must necessarily "'affect[]... the individual's right to vote and his right to associate,'"
Justice White concluded that "to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and
to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest ... would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated
equitably and efficiently." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983)). Consequently, the Court in Burdick employed a "more flexible standard"
than strict scrutiny. Id. at 434. But see infra Part V (arguing that the application of
strict scrutiny should not necessarily be inconsistent with a finding that state election
schemes are constitutionally valid).
16 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 780 (1974); see also Note, supra note 3, at 1115
(observing that the establishment of a time and place for voting and the institution
of a mechanism to record results are necessary functions of an electoral system).
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restrictions requires a proper familiarity with the historical develop-
ment and rationale of such restrictions. In order to place the later
discussion concerning modern ballot access restrictions in the appro-
priate context, this Part will briefly describe the evolution of and
statutory response to the electoral system in the United States.
The first formal elections in the pre-revolutionary colonies were
to the House of Burgesses in Virginia in 1619. As in many elections
of the period, candidates ran on a self-selective basis and were unop-
posed.17  Because most elections continued to be uncontested
throughout the pre-revolutionary period and into the nineteenth
century, the colonies and states exercised little control over ballot
access.' 8 As a result, in instances where the conclusion was not
foregone, voters were typically influenced by intimidation and
bribery.9 Interestingly, while many states regulated the physical
specifications of ballots, they often required the candidates to print
the ballots themselves, thereby excluding many from candidacy on
the basis of wealth.
21
The first major innovation in ballot access administration came
in 1832, with the introduction of the "Australian ballot." The
Australian ballot provided three significant modifications: 1) ballots
were printed by state governments at taxpayers' expense; 2) ballots
bore the names of all candidates who had been duly nominated
according to state law; 3) ballots were distributed by the government
at the site of the polls, marked in secret by each individual voter, and
deposited in a ballot box. This development increased government
involvement in the procedural administration of the electoral process
and marked the genesis of government regulation and restriction of
access to the ballot.
2'
Gradually, states developed complex schemes to determine pre-
cisely which individuals were to be placed on the ballot.22 States
27 See BoTT, supra note 3, at 86 (recounting George Washington's candidacy for a
seat in the Virginia House in 1755).
18 See id. at 87 (observing that the colonies' limited role in controlling elections
consisted primarily of setting the dates and places of elections and guarding against
ballot stuffing and duplicate voting).
"9 See id. at 91.
20 See id. (describing how the cost of supplying ballots often discouraged
independent candidates from running).
21 See id. (detailing the rise of the Australian ballot in America); see also EDwARD
M. SAlT, AMERICAN PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 560-62 (1927) (noting that the Australian
ballot was adopted in Massachusetts and Kentucky in 1888 and that 32 states had
adopted the mechanism by 1892).
1 For a thorough analysis of the development of ballot access restrictions, see
1996]
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have often defended these access restrictions as a means of promot-
ing the legitimate interests of political stability, avoiding voter
confusion, and minimizing polling expenses. 23  However, the
various political motivations behind state election schemes should
not be overlooked. First, the two major parties may utilize such
regulations to exclude minor parties and independent candidates
from the political arena and thus eliminate challenges to their
authority.24 Next, one of the major parties, having secured a
majority position in the legislature, may manipulate the legal
framework to consolidate this position by hindering the other major
party during the election process.25 Finally, individuals in positions
of power may attempt to reduce the challenge of dissident factions
within their own party via restricted ballot access. 2' As Part III will
illustrate, while legal challenges have occurred with respect to all of
these permutations, the greatest number of suits challenge ballot
restrictions that result in the exclusion of third parties or indepen-
dent candidates.
The regulation of political parties' access to the ballot is typically
accomplished through a complex set of election guidelines. In
Porto, supra note 14, at 287-89. Modem ballot access restrictions are commonly
viewed as having developed as a response to the success of the Progressive Party and
the Socialist Party in the 1912 elections and fear of the Communist Party in the 1930s
and 1940s. See id.
23 See infra Part M.
24 See BoTr, supra note 3, at 93 ("[B]y controlling the state governments, the two
major parties have used the lawmaking process as one way to ward off any threat of
significant challenges by third-party or independent candidates.").
I See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding that malapportionment
of Alabama state electoral districts denied citizens equal protection of the laws). In
Reynolds, the apportionment of legislative districts had not been recalculated to
account for the population shifts from rural to urban centers. Accordingly, rural
districts were overrepresented in the state legislature. See id. at 544-46. As the Court
noted that 25% of the state's population could control a majority of the legislature,
it was reasonable to infer that the political groups representing these minority rural
population centers opposed redistricting and its consequent loss of legislative power.
See id. at 547.
26 For a recent example of a state election scheme designed to ward off challenges
within the party structure, see Rockefeller v. Powers, 909 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
rev'd Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.Sd 1367 (2d Cir. 1995), discussed infra Part IV.F.
Additionally, see RobertJ. McCarthy, Forbes Hails Primary Ruling in Launching Upstate
Drive; BUFF. NEws, Dec. 1, 1995, at A14 and No Contest: Until New York Republicans
Rebe4 the Party Bosses Will Dictate Their Choice for President, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1995, at
A40 (noting that Senator Alfonse D'Amato is seeking to "lock up the [Republican
primary election in New York state] on behalf of Senator Bob Dole") for another
instance of party incumbents seeking to manipulate election results via ballot access
regulation.
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general, states have recognized three organizational means of
political expression-majority or "established" political parties,
"minor" or "new" political parties, and independent candidates.
Most states grant automatic access to the ballot box for majority or
existing parties.2" This status is reevaluated and legitimized on a
regular basis, typically by securing a requisite percentage of the vote
in a prior general election.28 A majority of the states also provide
procedures that permit minor or new parties to qualify for the ballot,
often by submitting petitions containing a minimum number of
eligible voter signatures.29 Finally, independent candidates-those
individuals not associated with any political party-may achieve access
to the ballot by filing petitions demonstrating a minimum of popular
support.30
As a result of the categorical conception of political entities, state
regulations concerning ballot access have come to be concentrated
in two distinct areas. First, legislation determines the polling
percentage necessary to receive the privileged status of "major" party,
with its corresponding automatic access to the general election
ballot. Second, statutes regulate the degree of popular support
required and the manner in which this support must be demonstrat-
ed for minor parties or independent candidates to have their names
placed on the ballot. Because the major parties substantively control
the legislative process in most states, the statutory requirements
typically do not present a problem for their continued access to the
ballot."1 Consequently, the areas of significant controversy have
27 See, e.g.,ALA. CODE §§17-7-1, 17-8-2.1,17-16-5,17-16-11, 17-16A-3, 17-19-2 (1995);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.25.030, 15.25.160, 15.25.170, 15.30.020, 15.30.025, 15.60.010(12)
(1988); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6340, 6343, 6520, 6523, 6121, 6125, 8400, 6041, 6061,
6062 (West 1996). For illuminating overviews of state ballot access laws, see BoTr,
supra note 3, at 114-38 tbl.3.2 and Note, supra note 3, at 112 n.1.
Other advantages given to majority parties include being given a column on the
ballot box, having candidates listed as members of the party, or receiving public
campaign financing. See BOrr, supra note 3, at 147 (discussing privileges afforded
to large parties).
I For an elaboration on the great variation among states in the required
percentage, see Note, supra note 3, at 1121 n.1.
I See id. at 1122; see also BOTr, supra note 3, at 146-47 (noting that while states
have various labels for political entities that receive only a small quantum of voter
support, virtually all states recognize this status as distinct from independent
candidates or "major" parties).
30 See BoTr, supra note 3, at 149-52 (describing state laws governing independent
candidates).
"' See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 111, 130
(1993) (noting that "a dominant political party may use its current electoral edge to
19961
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been the levels of support necessary for parties to qualify for
automatic access to the ballot and the numbers of signatures, the
geographic distributional requirements, and the time schedules
mandated for minor parties and independent candidates to achieve
ballot access.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Before any discussion of the judicial treatment of suffrage-related
regulations, a familiarity with the constitutional framework of the
liberties related to the right to vote is necessary. Accordingly, this
Part will present the basic constitutional parameters that empower
the states to regulate ballot access, and through which the Supreme
Court views the validity of such regulations. 2
A. State Control of Elections
Conspicuously, the Constitution makes no mention of the funda-
mental right to vote or of the right to hold free elections. 3
Because the Founding Fathers were unable to form a consensus on
the issues of suffrage and election administration, the Constitution
left the qualifications of voters in federal elections to be determined
by the states.3 4 Thus, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitu-
tion states that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second year by the people of the several
states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications
requisite for the electors of the most numerous Branch of the state
legislature." Similarly, the Seventeenth Amendment provides for the
popular election of senators in the same manner as members of the
create a structural advantage that will assist the party in winning future elections").
Note however, that while statutory requirements often do not affect whether a major
party will be on the ballot, such requirements may affect the candidate selected to
represent the majority party by restricting access to a primary election. See supra note
26.
52 This Comment does not purport to constitute an extensive constitutional
analysis of restrictions on the franchise, but rather will examine the Court's
jurisprudence in one specific area-state ballot access restrictions.
11 See BoIr, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing the consequences of the Founding
Fathers' omission of the right to vote in the Constitution).
" See id. (stating that "[a]t the convention the Founding Fathers could not agree
on who could vote, and as a result the Constitution left the qualifications of voters in
federal elections to be determined by the states"); see also TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1084
(observing that "[t]he Constitution endows the states with the power to determine
qualifications for voting even in federal elections").
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House of Representatives."5 Next, Article II, Section 1 provides
that the method for choosing electors for president and vice
president is substantially determined by the states, with Congressional
influence limited to the establishment of a uniform time for the
"chusing of Electors."8 6 Finally, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1
delegates to the states the power to regulate the "[t] he Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,"
subject to Congressional acquiescence.3 7
Accordingly, a facial reading of the Constitution seems to support
the proposition that states were intentionally given a large degree of
deference in the area of ballot access. This assertion may be
bolstered by a review of the Framers' intent. For example, respond-
ing to criticism that leaving the state regulation of federal elections
subject to congressional acquiescence might effectively subvert the
state's authority, James Madison stated that "congressional controul
will very probably never be exercised." He concluded that "[the
power [of congressional oversight] appears to me... as unlikely to
be abused as any part of the constitution.""8
35 See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1084 (noting the Seventeenth Amendment's impact
on the manner in which Senators are elected). While the Constitution originally
provided that state legislatures would elect Senators, the Seventeenth Amendment
altered this scheme and provided, in relevant part, that "[the electors in each State
shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislatures." U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
37 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. Section 4 continues, stating that "Congress may at
any time by law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators." The Supreme Court has explicitly found this language to "invest[]
Congress with broad power to regulate the entire spectrum of voting qualifications in
congressional elections." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1084-85 (citing Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355, 866 (1932)). Additionally, despite constitutional silence on the power of
Congress to regulate presidential and vice-presidential elections, the Court has held
that Congress "possesses the same power over such elections that it enjoys with respect
to congressional elections." Id. at 1085 (citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124
(1970)).
38 3 THE RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 311 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911). However, as Madison's remarks were made in defense of the Constitution
during debates in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, one should not overlook
the possibility of exaggeration due to political posturing. See, e.g.,John P. Roche, The
Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AMER. POL. ScI. REV. 799, 799 (1961)
(noting that the Constitutional Convention was a social, interactive process and that
the Federalist Papers presented a potentially misleadingview that the Constitution was
"designed"); Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST at xvi (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (observing that the Federalist Papers was a political instrument and must be
read in view of this fact). For additional support that the Framers intended to grant
the states great authority in the regulation of elections, see THE FEDERALIST No. 59,
at 362 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1996]
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B. State Elections
Federal authority to interfere in the regulation of state elections
is implicated only by the "Republican Guarantee Clause." 9 Conse-
quently, the qualifications for voters in state elections are "the exclu-
sive province of the state governments except insofar as they contra-
vene the Constitution." 4 This exclusivity of state authority to regu-
late state elections is supported by the notion of dual sovereignty
embodied in the Constitution.4' Because "[n]o function is more
essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and
their governments than the power to determine... the qualifications
of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the
nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices,"42 the
Supreme Court has long recognized the states' supremacy in this
area.
C. Other Constitutional Provisions
While the states are given great deference to regulate federal and
state elections, restrictions on the franchise must not contravene
express constitutional guarantees. 43  The constitutional provisions
that implicate the rights of suffrage include: the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, which bars racial restrictions; the Nineteenth Amendment,
which bars restrictions based on gender; the Twenty-fourth Amend-
ment, which bars poll taxes in federal elections; and the Twenty-sixth
Amendment, which bars minimum voting ages in excess of eighteen
years." In addition, regulations which inhibit the right to vote also
1961).
19 Article IV, Section 4 states in relevant part that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."
4 TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1085. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 insofar
as the Act prohibited the use of literacy tests in state elections and finding the Act to
be a valid use of the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments and thereby within congressional authority).
41 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (stating that because "the plan of the convention alms only at a partial
union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, excusively
delegated to the United States").
42 Mitchell 400 U.S. at 125 (quotingJustice Black, who delivered the opinion of the
Court as to judgment only).
4 See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1085 (describing constitutional obstacles to state
regulations).
4 See id.
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implicate the First Amendment rights of association and free speech,
as well as the Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due
process and equal protection.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT:
PLUNGING INTO THE "POLITICAL THICKET"
46
While the Supreme Court has often recognized the right to vote
as the most "precious" of all rights in a free society, this ultimate
liberty is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.47 Before an
examination of the means by which the Court has chosen to protect
this right may be undertaken, the "right" itself must be defined.
Preliminarily, it must be noted that the entitlement which is
commonly referred to as "the right to vote" substantively encompass-
es numerous distinct liberties which the Court has protected in
varying degrees. These rights include: the citizen's opportunity to
cast a vote, the community's ability to be represented within a larger
polity, a racial group's entitlement to cast an effective and meaning-
ful vote, the candidate's right to be placed on the ballot, and a
constituent's chance to contribute to a particular candidate. 8
While each of these rights affects distinct freedoms, they all similarly
implicate the electoral process which is at the core of our "federal
scheme of representative government."" Nevertheless, because
these fundamental rights were conspicuously omitted from the
Constitution, the Court has struggled to define the precise quality
and extent of these rights as well as the constitutional provisions with
which to protect them. Accordingly, one constitutional scholar has
observed that:
Given their essential character as parts of the election process,
rights relating to the franchise stand poised between procedural
due process, with its guarantee that an individual may participate
45 See id.
I Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (noting that ballot access
restrictions were nonjusticiable political questions and stating that state action
regarding the electoral process was a "political thicket" which the courts "ought not
to enter").
I See Wesberry v. Sanders, 876 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (stating that the Court has
interpreted Art. I, Section 2 of the Constitution to give "persons qualified to vote a
constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted").
48 See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1062; see also Gardner, supra note 3 (manuscript at 4-5,
on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (discussing the many compo-
nents of the right to vote for which litigants have sought constitutional protection).
49 TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1062.
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in the application of general rules to that individual's particular
situation, and the [F]irst [A]mendment, with its guarantee that an
individual be allowed to participate in the most general communi-
cative processes that determine the contours of our social and
political thought. At the same time, election-related rights display
the special feature that the equality with which they are made
available, rather than the fact of their availability or absence,
ordinarily proves decisive.5
This Part will assess the Court's jurisprudence in the area of state
ballot access restrictions-one small facet of the more general rubric
of the "right to vote"-and shall demonstrate that the Court's strug-
gles in this area have failed to clarify both the dimensions of the
rights implicated as well as the process by which those rights should
be examined.
Prior to 1968, the Court had declined to address the constitu-
tional issue of state-imposed restrictions to ballot access for third
parties and independent candidates." However, in Williams v.
Rhodes, the Court accepted jurisdiction and found an Ohio election
law that rendered it "virtually impossible" for third parties to be
placed on state ballots to choose electors for presidential elections as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.5 2 Since this initial foray into the area of ballot access, the
Court has ruled on the constitutionality of a number of state election
schemes. However, as this Part will demonstrate, the Court has failed
to articulate a consistent analytical standard with which to evaluate
state ballot access restrictions, appearing instead to rely on distinct
standards in each case.
5
3
A. Williams and the "Early" Cases
As Tribe has observed, the "Court's initial forays into the realm
of access requirements were oblique and not wholly consistent."5 4
Nevertheless, the common denominator of these "early" cases was the
Court's attempt to employ a standard of analysis that would be
o Id. (footnotes omitted).
51 See, e.g., Porto, supra note 14, at 288 (stating that "federal courts avoided the
issues raised in [the legal challenges posed by non-traditional candidates to ballot
access restrictions] until 1968"); Smith, supra note 14, at 174 (describing the Court's
decision in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), as a "new twist" in ballot access
laws).
52 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 24-25, 34.
" See Porto, supra note 14, at 281; Smith, supra note 14, at 186-87.
54 TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1102.
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compatible with its other equal protection jurisprudence. This
Section will illustrate the difficulties faced by the Court in this effort,
emphasizing in particular the inconsistencies and creative interpreta-
tions employed as the Court addressed the issues unique to each
case. In short, this Section will serve as an introduction to the
"doctrinal enigmas that bedevil the law of ballot access."
55
1. Williams v. Rhodes
In Williams v. Rhodes, the Court found a highly restrictive Ohio
election scheme violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 6 Because many subsequent opinions "pro-
fessed their fidelity to the paradigm supposedly enunciated in
Williams,"" it will be instructive to analyze the issues addressed in
Williams in considerable detail. The Ohio Election Code required
any new political party desiring to be placed on the general election
ballot to file petitions signed by qualified electors totaling fifteen
percent of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial
election. However, the existing Republican and Democratic Parties
were automatically placed on the ballot if they received in excess of
ten percent of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial election.58
The code also imposed many other substantial burdens that made
it "virtually impossible for any party to qualify for the ballot except
the Republican and Democratic Parties."59 One result was that the
55 Id.
56 See 393 U.S. at 23.
5' TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1103.
s See Williams, 393 U.S. at 24-26.
59 Id. at 25. The Williams Court noted that in addition to the 15% signature
requirement, the following burdens were imposed upon prospective third parties:
1. At the primary election, the new party was required to elect a state central.
committee consisting of two members from each congressional district and county
central committees for each county of Ohio. See id. at 25 n.1 (citing relevant Ohio
Code sections).
2. At the primary election, the new party was required to elect delegates and
alternates to a national convention. Because a candidate was prohibited from seeking
the office of delegate to the national convention or committeeman if he voted as a
member of a different party at a primary election in the preceding four-year period,
the new party was required to have over twelve hundred members who would be
willing to serve as committee members and delegates, none of whom had previously
voted in another party's primary. See id.
3. The candidates for nomination in the primary would be required to file
petitions signed by qualified electors. See id.
4. The Court also noted that a section of the Ohio code provided that a qualified
elector at a primary election was one who: a) voted for a majority of that party's
candidates at the last election, or b) had never voted in any election before. Since
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Ohio American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party were
required to file their petitions for inclusion on the Ohio presidential
ballot two months before the Republican and Democratic primaries
and nine months before the general election.6" The Independent
Party obtained in excess of the 433,100 signatures required, but
failed to meet the early filing deadline. The Socialist Labor Party,
despite having been in existence since 1892, retained only 108
members in Ohio and fell far short of the fifteen percent petition
requirement. 61 The parties brought suit, alleging that the filing
deadline and the complex primary regulations denied new parties
and their supporters the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
62
As an initial matter, the Court summarily accepted jurisdiction,
defining the issue presented as a "justiciable controversy.""3 The
Court then noted that, while Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution
empowers each State to "'appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors' . . . to choose a President
and Vice President," this in no way granted states the power to pass
laws regulating elections that violate any express provision of the
Constitution.64
The Court asserted that the Ohio election laws infringed the
"right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs" as well as the right of qualified voters to "cast their votes
effectively." 6' Because both of these rights "rank among our most
neither of the plaintiffs in Williams "had any candidates at the last preceding regular
state election, they would... [be forced] to seek out members who had never voted
before to sign the[ir] nominating petitions" and only these individuals could vote in
the new primary. See id.
"* See id. at 26-27.
61 See id. at 40.
62 See id. at 26.
Id. at 28 ("These cases do raise ajusticiable controversy under the Constitution
and cannot be relegated to the political arena."). Notably, the Court cited the then
recently decided Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), as demonstrative of the non-
political character of the issue. In finding a Tennessee legislative apportionment
scheme to be violative of equal protection, the Court in Baker announced a series of
factors which, if present, would render an issue solely political. But see Todd J.
Zywicki, Federal Judicial Review of State Ballot Access Regulations: Escape from the Political
Thicke 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 87, 125-33 (1994) (noting that the Court, flush with
success from the reapportionment cases, acted improperly in accepting jurisdiction
and "blundering" into the area of ballot access law). In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 556 (1946), the Court had announced that the electoral process was a "political
thicket" which the courts "ought not to enter."
6' Williams, 393 U.S. at 29 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2).
65 Id. at 30.
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precious freedoms" 6 and are thus "fundamental rights," the court
stated that "'only a compelling state interest [could] justify
limiting'" 7 such freedoms. 68  While commentators have been
quick to assert that the Court in Williams simply applied strict
scrutiny,69 it is significant to note that the Court did not discuss the
question of narrow tailoring"-traditionally, an integral facet of a
strict scrutiny analysis. Perhaps the Court's failure to identify any
"compelling" state interest rendered the question of a less restrictive,
equally effective legal scheme moot. Nevertheless, as future cases
indicate, the Court's declining to articulate the full strict scrutiny
standard may have been a deliberate maneuver to maintain a less
restrictive analysis in the area of ballot access jurisprudence.
In Williams, Ohio asserted four distinct interests served by the
access restrictions. First, the state argued that maintaining the
integrity of the two-party system and encouraging political stability
justified such a scheme. In rejecting this claim, the Court noted that
the Ohio system did not merely favor a two-party system, but rather
favored "two particular parties-the Republicans and the Demo-
crats-and in effect tend[ed] to give them a complete monopoly."
7 1
Thus, the Court did not repudiate the theoretical supposition that
support of a two-party system could reach the level of a "compelling"
state interest capable of outweighing even the most fundamental
individual liberties. Rather, the Court found that in this particular
6 Id.
67 Id. at 31 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
s For the Court's treatment of the freedom of association as a fundamental right,
see United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967), NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963), and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Additionally, the Court has asserted that "'[n]o right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined.'" Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 (quoting Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)). See alsoYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)
(stating that the right to vote is a "fundamental political right, because [it is]
preservative of all rights"). These rights are protected against encroachment by the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Notably, the cases discussed in this Comment concern state regulations which
have served to restrict candidates and parties from access to the ballot. Accordingly,
the Court's analysis in these cases typically confines itself to infringements of the right
to vote. A related area of the law that remains outside the scope of this Comment
concerns state action restricting the formation of political organizations. This latter
area ofjurisprudence deals to a greater extent with infringements on the right of
association.
69 See, e.g., Porto, supra note 14, at 290.
70 Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
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instance, the election scheme went beyond advocating a two-party
system and promoted two distinct entities and two unique ideological
philosophies to the exclusion of all others. As a result of such a
finding, the Court's analysis reads like a traditional discussion of the
benefits of free speech, stating that "[c]ompetition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of
the First Amendment freedoms."" The Court concluded that new
parties must have the freedom to organize and to compete in this
marketplace of ideas.72
Next, Ohio asserted its right to ensure that the winner of an
election be supported by the majority of voters. While conceding
that this may indeed be a legitimate state interest, the Court
explained that allowing the state to keep all political parties off the
ballot until they had enough support to win an election would "stifle
the growth of all new parties working to increase their strength." 3
Similarly, Ohio's interest in providing potential third-party supporters
with choices in leadership and ideology was not effectuated by the
legislative scheme.
7 4
Finally, the Court rejected Ohio's claim that the restrictive provi-
sions were justified to maintain a simple and orderly ballot for the
purpose of eliminating voter confusion. The Court replied that,
although the existence of "multitudinous fragmentary groups might
justify some regulatory control,"75 in the instant case, the danger
was "no more than 'theoretically imaginable' 7 ' and no such remote
71 Id.
72 For an interesting discussion of the "marketplace of ideas" theory of the First
Amendment, see C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 293, 300 (1981) (stating that "[tihe traditional
marketplace of ideas theorist claims that truth is a proper guide to how we should
organize society, and that the first amendment protection of the free trade of ideas
will advance us toward truth" but criticizing this theory as not "provid[ing] adequate
scope for the means needed for fundamental, progressive change").
7- Id. In fact, the restriction was a response to the results of the 1948 Ohio
presidential election. In 1948, the Ohio election code required third-party candidates
to secure signatures of only one percent of the registered voters. As a result, Henry
Wallace was placed on the ballot and prevented both Harry Truman and Thomas
Dewey from winning a majority of the popular vote cast. SeeBoTr, supra note 3, at 95.
4 Ohio had argued that requiring a new political party to maintain an elaborate
party structure and to organize a primary election ensured that supporters of the new
party's ideology would be able to choose from among various alternative spokesper-
sons for their ideas. The Court noted that, because no minor party could meet the
requirements, the true result was that "the Ohio system thus denie[d] the 'disaffected'
not only a choice of leadership but [also] a choice on the issues as well." Williams,
393 U.S. at 33.
751 Id. (emphasis added).
76 Id. (quoting United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217, 224
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danger could justify infringing the fundamental rights of association
and effective voting. Therefore, the Court found that the Ohio laws
imposed "invidious discrimination" violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stewart averred that:
[i] n view of the broad leeway specifically given the States by Article
II, Section 1, of the Constitution [in selecting presidential electors],
it seems clear to me that the basic standard of constitutional
adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause ... is the most
stringent test that properly can be held applicable here."
78
Stewart argued that the Court should apply a mere rational basis test,
asserting that "' It] he constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective.... A statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it.'" 79 Justice Stewart concluded that because the classification was
"clear[ly]" relevant to the achievement of the state's legitimate
objective, the election law was constitutional."0
2. Jenness v. Fortson: A Retreat from Strict Scrutiny
Two years after dissenting from the Court's finding that the Ohio
election law was unconstitutional in Williams, Justice Stewart wrote
the majority opinion as the Court evaluated Georgia's ballot access
law in Jenness v. Fortson."l The Georgia Election Code provided that
any candidate who had not entered and won a primary election of a
"political party" could only gain access to the general election ballot
by filing a nominating petition "signed by at least 5% of the number
(1967)).
1 Id. at 34. Commentators have noted that "the nature of the constitutional rights
implicated and the propriety and urgency of the state interests articulated [in
Williams] remained shrouded beneath a veneer of doctrinal generalizations." TRIBE,
supra note 2, at 1103. The rationale for this criticism is that Williams was an "easy"
case because the Ohio legislative scheme made it "'virtually impossible for a new
political party... to be placed on the state ballot'" and was decided hastily due to the
impending elections. Id. at 1102-03 (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 24). In its rush to
judgment, the Court may have treated the constitutional issues cavalierly. See id.
78 Williams, 393 U.S. at 51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)).
80 Id. at 53.
81 403 U.S. 431 (1971). Commentators have noted that, "[a]s thesis and antithesis,
Williams and Jenness frame the relevant issues" inherent in the ballot access debate.
TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1102.
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of registered voters at the last general election for the office in ques-
tion."
8 2
In rejecting the appellants' First and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges, the Court rested itsjudgment on the fundamental finding
that the Georgia electoral system "in no way [froze] the [political]
status quo.""8 Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court, ar-
rived at this result principally by distinguishing the decision in Wil-
liams.8 4 Justice Stewart, finding that "nothing [in the Georgia elec-
tion system] abridg~ed] the rights of free speech and association,"
declined to invoke strict scrutiny and recognized the state's interest
82Jenness, 403 U.S. at 432 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1010 (1970)). The Georgia
Election Code provided that "[a]ny political organization whose candidate received
20% or more of the vote at the most recent gubernatorial or presidential election is
a 'political party.'" Id. at 483 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 84-108(u)). Any other political
organization was defined as a "political body." See id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 84-
103(s)). "Political parties" were permitted to conduct primary elections regulated by
state law. The winner of the primary was placed on the ballot of the general election
as the nominee of the party. See id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-104 to -1006, -1008,
-1009, -1014, -1015, -1102, -1301 to -1308, -1308, -1507, -1513). Alternatively, a
nominee of a "political body" or an independent candidate could have her name
placed on the general election ballot by filing a nominating petition. See id. (citing
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1001). The petition required signatures of at least five percent
of the total number of electors eligible to vote in the last election for the office the
candidate was seeking. The filing deadline was the same as that required of a
candidate filing in a party primary. See id. at 433-34 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
1010(e), -1010(b)).
'Jenness, 403 U.S. at 439. The appellants included the Georgia Socialist Workers
Party's nominee for Governor and two nominees for the House of Representatives.
"Justice Stewart stated that, in serving the state's interest, Georgia's election
scheme did not unduly restrict ballot access. Justice Stewart noted the following
differences between the Ohio restrictions in Wii7m and the Georgia regulations:
1) Georgia freely provided for write-in votes; 2) Georgia did not require every
candidate to be the nominee of a political party, but recognized independent
candidates; 8) Georgia did not fix an unreasonably early deadline for filing signature
petitions by candidates not endorsed by established parties; 4) Georgia did not require
small and new parties to establish "elaborate primary election machinery"; 5) Georgia
allowed voters to sign a petition for a third-party candidate despite having signed the
petition of an independent candidate; and 6) Georgia did not require petition
signatures to be notarized. See id. at 438-89.
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in avoiding voter confusion to justify the requirements. 5 Justice
Stewart noted that:
There is surely an important state interest in requiring some
preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before
printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the
ballot-the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception,
and even frustration of the democratic process at the general
election.
8 6
3. Intermediate Scrutiny: Storer v. Brown and
American Party v. White
The Court's incongruous opinions in Williams and Jenness gener-
ated significant uncertainty concerning the constitutionality of state
ballot access restrictions. The Court's subsequent opinions in Storer
v. BrownB7 and American Party v. White' not only failed to clarify
the jurisprudence, but also exacerbated the problem.
Four years after the decision in Jenness, the Court examined First
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to five provisions of the
California Election Code in Storer v. Brown. 9 In assessing the
constitutionality of the state's disaffiliation requirement, the Court
creatively reinterpreted its decision in Williams as one that recognized
I Id. at 440. Given its previous analysis in Williams, the Court's assessment in
Jenness has been described as "striking." See Smith, supra note 14, at 181, 185 ("While
the Georgia law was not as restrictive as the statute struck down in Williams, the
difference was not so great as the Jenness Court tried to make it appear."). Smith
asserted that "becauseJenness found compelling those same state interests that Williams
specifically rejected, this element of the decision approached outright reversal." Id.
at 185. Smith noted that "it is surprising that five justices who had voted in Williams
to strike down the Ohio law voted in Jenness to uphold the Georgia law." Id.; see also
Zywicki, supra note 63, at 113 (stating that "the Court retreated dramatically in
Jenness).
'Jenness, 403 U.s. at 442.
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
415 U.S. 767 (1974).
89 Storer, 415 U.S. at 726-27. Independent congressional, presidential and vice-
presidential candidates essentially challenged two effects of the regulations: 1) a
disaffiliation restriction that denied ballot access to independent candidates who had
voted in the immediately preceding primary or registered with a qualified political
party within one year prior to the preceding primary; and 2) the aggregate effect of
several nominating petition regulations that required independent candidates to
secure signatures of at least five percent of the voters in a 24-day period and
prohibited signatures from persons who had voted in the primary elections. See id.
(citing CAL. ELic. CODE §§ 6830(c), 6830(d), 6831, 6833, 6830(c) (Supp. 1974)).
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the states' substantial interests in encouraging compromise and
stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner represented
a majority of the community, and in avoiding voter confusion." In
fact, the Court asserted that the Williams decision "inferred that
'reasonable requirements for ballot position' ... would be accept-
able."
9 1
In holding the disaffiliation requirement constitutional, the Court
cited the state's compelling interest in furthering the stability of its
political system as outweighing the interest of the candidates and
their supporters.92 Significantly, however, the Court did not discuss
whether such a "compelling" interest was necessary to overcome the
individual rights infringed and did not undertake an inquiry into the
availability of relatively less restrictive alternative means of ensuring
such political stability-traditional hallmarks of a strict scrutiny
analysis. Thus, the Court seemed to employ a standard less exacting
than strict scrutiny."
In addition, the Court cited Bullock v. Carter as support for the
state's legitimate interest in "'protect[ing] the integrity of its political
processes."' 94 The Court explained that "'[a]lthough we have no
way of gauging [the level of ballot overcrowding] if access to the
ballot were unimpeded ... we are bound to respect the legitimate
objectives of the State."'95 Thus, the Court evidently abandoned its
position in Williams that held merely "'theoretically imaginable'"
dangers to be insufficient to warrant infringement of the right of
association and the right to vote.9
The same day the Court decided Storer, it also assessed the
constitutionality of various aspects of the Texas election system in
American Party v. White. 7 The Court remained "wholly unpersuad-
90 See id. at 729.
9' Id. (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 32).
92 See id. at 786.
93 See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1107 (noting that "[t]he most baffling aspect of...
Storerwas the standard of review being applied" and commenting that both Storer and
American Party employed standards "far less demanding" than strict scrutiny); see also
Fred H. Perkins, Note, Better Late Than Never: The John Anderson Cases and the
Constitutionality of Filing Deadlines, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 691, 708 (1983) (finding that
"[alithough the Court has never clearly distinguished [its standards of review], the
overall reasoning process of [the ballot access cases] reveal [sic] that the Court is
often not rigidly applying the standard that it enunciates").
94 Storer, 415 U.S. at 733 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972)).
95Id. at 732 (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145).
96 Williams, 393 U.S. at 33 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 224 (1967)).
17 415 U.S. 767 (1974). Minority political parties, their candidates and supporters,
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ed" that the Texas scheme discriminated against third parties and
independent candidates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
finding the claims wholly "without merit."98 The Court observed
that the convention and petition process was no more burdensome
to third parties and independent candidates than primary elections,
run-off elections and party conventions were to major parties.9
Notably, the Court stated that the requirements were "constitutional-
ly valid measures, reasonably taken in pursuit of vital state objectives
that cannot be served equally well in significantly less burdensome
ways." 100 Consequently, with respect to these particular require-
ments, the Court seemed to inquire into the relative restrictiveness
of alternative measures. However, in its entirety, the standard
employed by the Court fell short of pure strict scrutiny.
Overall, the Court's opinion in American Party demonstrates the
Court's almost ad hoc determination of the relative constitutionality
of various provisions of the Texas Election Code.10' In affirming
and independent candidates challenged a one percent support requirement as well
as regulations mandating precinct conventions and petition conditions. In addition,
petitioners challenged a preprimary ban on petition circulation, the disqualification
of voters who had participated in other parties' nominating processes from signing
petitions, a 55-day limitation on securing signatures, and a requirement that all
signatures be notarized. See id. at 779 (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE arts. 13.12, 13.45(1)
(1967 & Supp. 1973)).
9s Id. at 780-81.
9See id. at 781.
100 Id.
101 The Court rejected the petitioners' claim that the one percent support require-
ment was invidious, citing the state's "admittedly vital interests ... that political
parties appearing on the general ballot demonstrate a significant, measurable
quantum of community support" and observing that two of the petitioners had met
the requirement. Id. at 782, 783-84. The Court also rejected the petitioners'
argument that the disqualification of primary voters from signing ballot petitions was
unconstitutional. The Court felt that this requirement merely acted to prevent voters
from essentially voting twice in the primary process, finding that "the State may
determine that it is essential to the integrity of the nominating process to confine
voters to supporting one party and its candidates in the course of the same
nominating process." Id. at 786. Similarly, the Court found that the 55-day time limit
was not "too onerous" and that the notary requirement was the only means available
to the state to ensure that voters did not vote twice for the same office. Id. at 787.
Next, the Court upheld the validity of the signature requirement for independent
candidates despite the fact that candidates were permitted only 30 days in which to
gather them. See id. at 788-89. Likewise, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of
the Texas statute that authorized public financing of the costs incurred by the major
political parties in the primary process but made no provision for the financing of
minor parties and independents. The Court opined that a state is not required to
"finance the efforts of every nascent political group seeking to organize itself." Id. at
794. Finally, the Court remanded for further consideration the state's practice of
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the dismissal of declaratory and injunctive relief sought by petition-
ers, the Court clearly entertained more than a mere rational basis
test, but fell far short of the probing analysis indicative of strict
scrutiny in other areas of jurisprudence." 2
4. Filing Fees: Bullock v. Carter and Lubin v. Panish
During the time period that the Supreme Court decided Storer
and American Party, it also decided two cases in which state regula-
tions imposed a filing fee as a prerequisite to ballot access. In Bullock
v. Carter, the Court examined a Texas statute that required the
payment of a filing fee as an absolute prerequisite to a candidate's
participation in a primary election.'
As an initial matter, the Court directly assessed the standard of
review appropriate to analyze the issues at hand. Chief Justice
Burger, writing the opinion for the Court, observed that the Court
had never considered candidacy itself as a distinct fundamental right
sufficient to invoke heightened scrutiny.10 4 However, because the
exclusionary nature of the filing fees directly and purposefully affect-
ed the ability of voters to exercise their rights of suffrage, Justice
Burger found a heightened level of scrutiny to be appropriate. Ac-
cordingly, Justice Burger stated that:
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable
impact on the exercise of the franchise, and because this impact is
related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular
candidate, we conclude ... that the laws must be "closely scruti-
nized" and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of
legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster.105
While this level of review is certainly greater than the mere
rationality required in Jenness, it is nonetheless arguably less strict
than the scrutiny employed by the Court in Williams0 6 and certain-
ly less rigorous than a pure strict scrutiny as applied in cases such as
printing only the two major established political parties on absentee ballots. See id.
at 794-95.
102 For example, see the reapportionment cases of Karcher v. Dagge, 462 U.S. 725
(1988) (finding that a New Jersey reapportionment plan that was insufficiently
reflective of the population deprived citizens of equal representation) and Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding that malapportionment of Alabama state electoral
districts denied citizens equal protection of the laws).
103 See 405 U.S. 134, 136 (1972).
104 See id. at 142-43.
105 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
106 See Porto, supra note 14, at 297.
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Brown v. Board of Education.0 7 Most notably, the Court in Bullock
merely required a legitimate state interest, whereas the Court in
Williams required a compelling state interest. The Court in Bullock
recognized two legitimate state interests furthered by the filing fees,
but nevertheless ultimately concluded that the Texas filing fees were
unconstitutional."' 8  Similarly, in Lubin v. Panish09 the Court
assessed the constitutionality of a California statute that required the
payment of a filing fee in order to be placed on the ballot in the
primary election.' The Court declared that the state's legitimate
interest in eliminating frivolous candidates from the ballot "must be
achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden
either a minority party's or an individual candidate's equally
important interest in the continued availability of political opportuni-
ty.""' Thus, the Court in Lubin held that conditioning candidacy
solely on the basis of ability to pay without providing any alternative
means of securing access to the ballot was "not reasonably necessary
to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate election inter-
ests."
1 12
The Court reasoned that a filing fee was simply an inaccurate
method of determining a candidate's "seriousness" and recom-
mended that states utilize a system of nominating petitions to test a
potential candidate's level of popular support. In reaching this
result, the Court interpreted its holding in Bullock as "expressly
reject[ing] the validity of filing fees as the sole means of determining
a candidate's 'seriousness."' 1 Thus, although the Court in Bullock
117 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding that racially segregated educational facilities
were "inherently unequal").
"0s See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149. The Court found that the filing fees were
'extraordinarily ill-fitted" to protecting the state's legitimate interest in regulating the
number of candidates on the ballot and also determined that Texas' other legitimate
interest furthered by filing fees-apportioning the cost of primary elections to those
candidates who participated-was not "necessary." See id. at 144-49 (stating that filing
fees were not "necessary" because the election could be funded from the state's
general treasury). In finding the Texas system unconstitutional, the Court cautiously
limited the holding to the "salient" features of the case and emphasized that the result
in no way "cast doubt on the validity of reasonable candidate filing fees." Id. at 149
(emphasis added).
109 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
"I See id. The petitioner in Lubin was an indigent who was unable to pay the filing
fee of $701.60, and admittedly would have been unable to pay a filing fee of as little
as $1. See id. at 710, 714.
"I Id. at 716.
112 Id. at 718.
Is Id. at 716.
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had stated unambiguously that "reasonable" filing fees would
certainly be valid, Lubin evidently stands for the proposition that a
filing fee of any amount is "unreasonable" if the potential candidate
is not presented with an alternative to paying the filing fee."
4
5. Return to Strict Scrutiny?:
Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party
In assessing the constitutionality of several provisions of the
Illinois Election Code in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party,"5 the Court once again utilized a heightened stan-
dard of review, employing the "clearest example of strict scrutiny"
since Williams.
116
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall observed that
"[r] estrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and funda-
mental rights, 'the right of individuals to associate for the advance-
ment of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters ... to cast
their votes effectively.""1 7  Because such "vital individual rights"
were implicated, the Court declared that a state regulation could
only be constitutional if the "classification [was] necessary to serve a
compelling [state] interest."118 Whereas the opinion in Illinois State
Board of Elections is certainly notable for its employment of this strict
scrutiny standard, the case is truly remarkable for the fact thatJustice
Marshall cited American Party v. White, Storer v. Brown, and Williams v.
Rhodes as direct support for this standard. 9 As discussed above,
the Court in American Party found the state regulations to be
"constitutionally valid measures, reasonably taken in pursuit of vital
state objectives." 2 ' Similarly, while the Court in Storer found the
114 Although Justice Douglas regarded the entire case as one concerning wealth
discrimination, see id. at 719 (Douglas, J., concurring), the majority concluded by
citingJenness for the proposition that "[t] he point, of course, is that ballot access must
be genuinely open to all, subject to reasonable requirements." Id. at 719 (citing
Jenness v. Forston, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971)).
15 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
11 Porto, supra note 14, at 299.
117 Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
I's Id.
119 See id. at 184. But see Justice Blackmun's concurrence, which emphasizes an
"unrelieved discomfort" at the Court's continued adherence to the conclusory analysis
inherent in the leveled scrutiny structure, and states that the phrases of "compelling
[state] interest," and "least drastic [restrictive] means" are "not very helpful for
constitutional analysis." Id. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"0 American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (emphasis added).
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state's "interest in [furthering] the stability of its political system" to
outweigh the interest of the candidates and their supporters,' the
Court did not address the strength of the relationship between the
regulation and the state objective demanded of a constitutionally
valid scheme. Quite to the contrary, the Court in Storer seemed to
rest its holding on a finding that the California Code's disaffiliation
requirement did not discriminate against independents because it
also prohibited party candidates from registering with another party
within one year of candidacy declaration.122 Lastly, although the
Court in Williams found that "'only a compelling state interest...
can justify limiting'" fundamental freedoms, again the Court did not
address the degree of relationship required between the state
election scheme and the state interest to be furthered."
In Illinois State Board of Elections, the Court observed that the
petitioning requirement furthered the state's "legitimate" interest in
assuring that the winner of an election represents the majority of
voters.124 However, the Court then declared that when furthering
a legitimate interest, "a State may not choose means that unneces-
sarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty"'25 and cited Lubin
for the proposition that "[s]tates [must] adopt the least drastic
means to achieve their ends." 126 While the Court in the past had
essentially failed to require state regulations to be narrowly tailored
to meet state interests in the context of ballot access restrictions, it
now asserted that Lubin'27 demanded no less. Not surprisingly, the
Court ultimately found that the disparate signature requirements in
the Illinois Election Code violated the Equal Protection Clause and
were thus invalid. 2 '
12 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).
' See id. at 734.
11 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
124 See Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184-85.
12 Id. at 185 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973) (finding
invalid an Illinois statute that prohibited a person from voting in primaries of
different parties unless a 24-month waiting period had elapsed)).
126 Id.
27 See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (suggesting that Lubin was
arguably a case more concerned with wealth discrimination than ballot access).
'2 See Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 186-87. The Court compounded the
confusion inherent in this decision by failing to explicitly identify a "compelling" state
interest. As discussed above, the Court merely alluded to a state's "legitimate interest
in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot." Id. at 184-85. However,
because the Court proceeded to inquire as to whether the state law represented the
"least drastic" means to achieve the state objective, the opinion presumably implied
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B. Emergence of a Balancing Test:
Anderson v. Celebrezze and Subsequent Cases
Four years after creatively knitting together precedent to
construct a heightened standard of review sufficient to find the
Illinois nominating petitions in Illinois State Board of Elections as
violative of equal protection, the Court utterly abandoned the use of
tiered scrutiny and equal protection analysis in favor of a balancing
test and due process analysis in Anderson v. Ceebrezze."' Instead of
clarifying ballot access jurisprudence once and for all, Anderson
seemed only to add to the confusion.
1. Anderson v. Celebrezze
In Anderson, an independent candidate for president of the
United States challenged an Ohio statute which required indepen-
dent candidates to file a statement of candidacy and nominating
petition in March in order to qualify for the general election ballot
in November.' 0 The candidate, who ultimately secured 5.9% of
the popular vote cast in Ohio and 6.6% of the popular vote cast in
the nation, challenged the early filing deadline as violative of his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
As in previous cases, the Court initially observed that while the
filing deadline affected candidates' rights, the requirement inevitably
implicated the rights of voters as well. Writing for the five member
majority, Justice Stevens asserted that it "is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech." 1 ' The Court then explicitly stated that it
would base its conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and would not "engage in a separate Equal Protection
Clause analysis."'3 2 Nevertheless, the Court continued to rely on
its previous jurisprudence in this area, citing Williams, Bullock, Lubin
that the state's interest had met the first requirement of strict scrutiny-a compelling
interest. Id. at 185. Consequently, Illinois State Board of Elections appears to indicate
that maintaining a manageable number of names on the ballot is indeed a
"compelling" state interest.
9 See 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
"s See id. at 782-83 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 8518.25.7 (Supp. 1982)).
.. Id. at 787 (quotingJustice Harlan in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
1S2 Id. at 786-87 n.7.
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and Illinois Board of Elections to support its use of a due process
analysis. Finally, the Court cited Williams and Lubin for the proposi-
tion that the early filing deadline infringed individuals' right to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of
voters to effectively cast their votes."' 3 Consequently, the Court
inexplicably redefined its analysis of candidate eligibility require-
ments in such a way as to infringe upon the substantive due process
rights of voters.
Next, the Court announced a three-part balancing test with which
to analyze state election laws that infringe individual rights but that
nonetheless further legitimate state interests. Justice Stevens asserted
that a court must:
1) first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. 2) It then must identify and
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifica-
tions for the burden imposed by its rule. 3) In passing judgement,
the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of
each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.
Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a
position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitu-
tional.Y4
Incredibly, the Court cited Williams, Bullock, American Party and
Illinois State Board of Elections as support for this balancing test.3 5
After employing the three prongs of the test, the Court then deter-
mined that the "'extent and nature' of the burdens.., placed on the
voters' freedom of choice and freedom of association... unquestion-
ably outweigh[ed] the State's minimal interest in" enacting the
statute.11
Additionally, the Court in Anderson asserted that burdens on
"small political parties or on independent candidates impinge[], by
15 See id. at 787.
IT d. at 789 (numbering added for clarity).
" SeesupraPartlIlA (illustrating that the Court unquestionably employed varying
degrees of scrutiny in each of these cases).
" Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806. While the Court in Anderson ultimately found the
state's interest insufficient tojustify the legislation, commentators have noted that the
Anderson balancing approach in the abstract may provide a greater degree of
constitutional latitude than a heightened scrutiny equal protection analysis because
the balancing approach affords greater weight to state interests. See Porto, supra note
14, at 302.
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[their] very nature," on First Amendment rights." 7 The Court
specifically alluded to its oft-cited discussion of discrete and insular
minorities in footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,'
38
stating that "because the interests of minor parties and independent
candidates are not well represented in state legislatures, the risk that
the First Amendment rights of those groups will be ignored in
legislative decisionmaking may warrant more careful judicial
scrutiny."3 9 Recalling that the Court utilized this rationale to
justify the employment of strict scrutiny in the context of "suspect
classes," it becomes clear that at the same time the Court in Anderson
announced a balancing test, it also implied that strict scrutiny may be
the appropriate mechanism by which to analyze ballot access
restrictions.
2. A Balancing Test with Ambiguity:
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party
In 1986, the Court decided Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,'4° its
first ballot access case since the development of the Anderson
balancing test. While not explicitly announcing the employment of
the balancing test, the Court implied its continued adherence to a
substantive due process analysis by stating that "the burdens imposed
on appellees' First Amendment rights... are [not] too severe to be
justified by the State's interest in restricting access to the general
ballot." 4 ' Additionally, because the Court did not discuss potential
equal protection violations, it is reasonable to presume that the
Court maintained a preference for the Anderson approach. Never-
theless, the opinion in Munro is not without ambiguity. Specifically,
the Court chose to compare the analysis of the state statutes and
individual rights infringed in Munro with the analyses in Jenness,
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793-94.
18 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4. (1938).
139 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 n.16.
'- 479 U.S. 189 (1986). In Munro, the Socialist Workers Party, its nominee, and
two voters challenged a Washington State statute that required that a minor-party
candidate for a partisan office receive at least one percent of all votes cast for that
office in the state's primary election in order to be placed on the ballot for the
general election. See id. at 191-93 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 29.18.110 (1985)). The
party's nominee received 596 votes of the 681,690 votes cast in the primary. See id.
at 192 n.9. As this constituted 0.09% of the total votes cast, the nominee was denied
a place on the general ballot. See id. at 192.
141 Id. at 196.
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American Party, and Storer.14 2 Further, while the Court in Munro
implicitly appeared to rely on the Anderson test, it alluded with
equivalent precedential effect to American Party and Jenness through
its references to the states' "compelling" and "important" interests in
the latter cases. 14' Additional ambiguity in Munro stems from
Justice White's assertion that a state was not required to demonstrate
that an election scheme, which demanded a showing of voter support
prior to granting access, was a response to any distinct historical
phenomenon. Apparently disregardingJustice Black's conclusion in
Williams that no merely "theoretically imaginable" danger could
justify infringing the fundamental rights of association and effective
voting," Justice White stated that "[w]e have never required a
State to make a particularized showing of the existence of voter
confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous
candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on
ballot access." 145 Thus, in seeking to avoid battles concerning
evidentiary sufficiency, the Court in Munro announced the constitu-
tionality of proactive state legislation in the area of ballot access
restrictions.
Finally, citing Lubin, the Court concluded that "Washington
simply has not substantially burdened the 'availability of political
opportunity. '"146 However, as the ballot restriction in Lubin con-
cerned a filing fee, the Court's examination in that case was doctrin-
ally a pure equal protection analysis 147 and therefore not necessari-
ly analogous to the reasoning required by the facts of Munro.
14 See id. at 198-99.
"" See id. at 193-94.
'4 Williams v. Rhodes, 898 U.S. 28, 83 (1968) (citing United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 224 (1967)).
Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95.
'"Id. at 199 (quoting Lubin v. Parish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974)).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 109-112. As additional evidence of the
Court's equal protection analysis in Lubin, note the Court's quotation from Justice
Stewart's concurrence in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 59 n.2 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring), that "[i]t has been established... that the
Equal Protection Clause confers the substantive right to participate on an equal basis
with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an electoral process for
determining who will represent any segment of the State's population." Lubin, 415
U.S. at 713-14.
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3. A Return to Strict Scrutiny?: Norman v. Reed
In 1992, the Court once again decided the constitutionality of an
Illinois ballot access statute in Norman v. Reed.14  In his analysis,
Justice Souter recognized the long-established constitutional right,
derived from the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of citizens to
create and develop new political parties. 149 Essentially abandoning
the recently announced Anderson balancing test in favor of an equal
protection analysis, Justice Souter observed:
To the degree that a State would thwart this interest by limiting the
access of new parties to the ballot, we have called for the demon-
stration of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the
limitation... and we have accordingly required any severe restric-
tion to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance.'
50
Remarkably, Justice Souter cited Anderson as the source for this
"observation.""
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the statute as
interpreted was overbroad and found the regulation to "violate [] the
First Amendment right of political association."'5 2 Thus, despite
'- 502 U.S. 279 (1992). Under Illinois law, organizers of a "new" political party
were required to secure the signatures of 25,000 eligible voters in order to run
candidates for statewide elections. See id. at 282 (explaining ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/10-2
(West 1989)). Similarly, in order to run a candidate in a "political subdivision" of the
state, organizers were required to obtain the signatures of 25,000 eligible voters from
the subdivision. See id. Finally, if the subdivision itself was comprised of large
separate districts, the party organizers were required to collect 25,000 signatures from
each separate district. See id. If a party obtained at least five percent of the vote in
any general election, it became an "established" party. See id. at 283. Petitioners were
members of the Harold Washington Party [hereinafter HWP]-an "established" party
in the city of Chicago-but sought to expand the scope of their political activities to
Cook County, which subsumes Chicago. See id. However, because Cook County
consists of two distinct districts, the "city district" of Chicago and the "suburban
district," the aforementioned law required them to obtain 25,000 signatures in each
district. See id. at 284. After the HWP was able to secure 44,000 signatures in the city
district, but only 7,800 signatures in the suburban district, the question arose as to the
impact of the statutory scheme on the ability of the party to obtain ballot access in the
city-wide elections, the suburban-district elections, and the overall county-wide
elections. See id. at 284-87.
149 See id. at 288.
'50 Id. at 288-89 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) and
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 186
(1979)); see also Porto, supra note 14, at 304 (stating thatJustice Souter "made it clear
that strict scrutiny of laws that restrict ballot access [was] not dead").
i5' See Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89.
112 Id. at 290. The Court thus reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's holding that
petitioners were prohibited from using the HWP name in Cook County because HWP
PRUNING THE POLITICAL THICKET
having seemingly announced previously that an equal protection
analysis would be the appropriate mechanism of constitutional
review, Justice Souter undertook solely an examination of a First
Amendment violation. By failing to engage in a separate equal
protection analysis, Justice Souter apparently employed a substantive
due process/Anderson-like inquiry. Compounding this confusion,
however, the Court evidently utilized a heightened scrutiny review
(which had heretofore been consistent with equal protection
challenges), as opposed to a balancing test such as that derived in
Anderson.1
5 3
was already an "established" party in Chicago. See id. at 289-90 (noting that ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-5 (1989) (currently codified at 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10.5
(West 1993)) prohibited the use of the name of any "established" party). The Illinois
Supreme Court had read the statute "so literally as to bar candidates running in one
political subdivision from ever using the name of a political party established only in
another." Id. at 289 (emphasis added). Justice Souter reasoned that such a
"Draconian construction" would prevent the incremental development of new political
parties, as only those parties which possessed the initial resources to conduct activities
on a broad scale could ever participate in the electoral process on a statewide basis.
Id. The Court observed that simply allowing candidates to obtain formal permission
to use the name of an established party would accomplish the state's legitimate
interest in avoiding voter confusion and the "denigrat[ion of] party cohesiveness."
Id. at 285, 290. The Court noted that this was true of the instant case: Timothy
Evans, the only HWP candidate to run in Chicago's most recent municipal election,
had authorized petitioners to use the HWP name in Cook County. See id. at 290.
1' Additionally, the Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's holding which
disqualified HWP from ballot access for failing to satisfy the 25,000 signature per
component district requirement. See id. at 291-93. The Court observed that the
Illinois law essentially "retain[ed] the constitutional flaw at issue in [Illinois State Board
of Elections v.] Socialist Workers Party by effectively" requiring a greater number of
signatures to obtain ballot access in political subdivisions than to obtain ballot access
in statewide elections. See id. at 293; see also supra Part IIIA5 (discussing in detail the
Court's rationale and holding in Illinois State Board of Elections). Recall that prior to
Illinois State Board of Elections, Illinois law required a new party to secure 25,000
signatures in order to obtain ballot access for statewide elections, but required a new
party to secure signatures of five percent of the eligible voters in order to qualify for
elections in political subdivisions. See Norman, 502 U.S. at 292. In a direct response
to the outcome of Illinois State Board of Elections, the state capped the five percent
requirement at 25,000. See id. In Norman however, the Court noted that because new
parties seeking access in political subdivisions were required to obtain 25,000
signatures in each component subdivision, such parties were still obligated to obtain
a significantly greater number of signatures (a multiple of 25,000) for political subdivi-
sions than for statewide elections. See id. at 293. Thus the essential constitutional
infirmity of Illinois State Board of Elections remained. See supra Part HI.A.5. Justice
Souter noted that although the state may have had a legitimate interest in ensuring
that a new party demonstrated adequate public support throughout the subdivision,
the instant statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. See Norman, 502 U.S. at 293.
Justice Souter asserted that the state could simply have required a party to show a
proper distribution of support while maintaining the aggregate 25,000 signature cap.
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4. Write-in Ballots: Burdick v. Takushi
In addition to striking down the Illinois election scheme chal-
lenged in Norman in 1992, the Court assessed the constitutionality of
Hawaii's prohibition on write-in ballots in Burdick v. Takushi. 4
Writing for a six-member majority, Justice White announced that not
every law that "imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be
subject to strict scrutiny."15 5 Justice White reasoned that the Con-
stitution granted to states the power to prescribe the "'Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Represen-
tatives,"'156 and that as a practical matter, states must engage in a
"substantial regulation of elections" to avoid chaos. 57 Finally, a
recognition of the fact that all election laws necessarily "affect[] ...
the individual's right to vote and his right to associate," led Justice
White to conclude that "to subject every voting regulation to strict
scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling state interest ... would tie the hands of States
seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficient-
ly."158  Consequently, the Court explicitly employed the "more
flexible standard" of Anderson.159
Thus, remarkably, the Court utilized a standard of strict scrutiny
in Norman and a balancing test in Burdick in the very same year.
Justice White explained the Court's analysis as follows: In general,
the Court would weigh the character and magnitude of the individual
interests asserted against the state objectives. (This is essentially the
Anderson balancing test.) The "rigorousness" of this inquiry however,
would depend upon the extent to which the challenged statute
burdened First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Regulations that
impose "severe" restrictions would have to be "narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance" (a standard
See id. at 293-94. The Court noted that the internal inconsistency of the Illinois
election scheme also fatally undermined the state's asserted interest in requiring a
proportional distribution of public support. See id. at 294. Specifically, Justice Souter
observed that such distribution was not required of new parties seeking to gain ballot
access in statewide elections, and therefore it "requires elusive logic to demonstrate
a serious state interest in demanding such a distribution for new local parties." Id.
'- 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (addressing a Hawaiian citizen's allegation that the state's
ban on write-in voting infringed his First Amendment right of expression and associa-
tion).
15- Id. at 432.
156 Id. at 433 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1).
157 See id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
'5 Id. (citation omitted).
159 Id. at 434.
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uncannily similar to strict scrutiny), but laws that subject voters to
"reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" would generally be held
constitutional.16 ° Essentially, the Court created a "balancing test"
which was no more than a veiled tiered scrutiny analysis-"severe
restrictions" must be "narrowly drawn" to advance a compelling state
interest (strict scrutiny); but "reasonable" restrictions are presump-
tively valid (rational basis).61
In Burdick, the Court observed that Hawaii's relatively unfettered
access to the primary ballot offered disaffected voters sufficient
opportunity to express themselves. 1 62 Explicitly applying the first
prong of the Anderson balancing test, the Court concluded that the
ban on write-in voting imposed only a "limited burden" on voters'
rights. 6 ' Employing the second prong of the test, the Court
accepted as valid the State's "legitimate" interests in "avoid [ing] the
possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election,"'
64
"averting divisive sore-loser candidacies,"" and guarding against
"party raiding."'66 The Court found these interests sufficient to
outweigh the "limited burden" imposed on Hawaii's voters and held
the ban on write-in ballots to be constitutional.
67
' Id. (citations omitted).
6 Significantly, the Court cited Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972), for the
proposition that the mere fact that a state election law tends to limit the field of
available candidates "does not of itself compel close scrutiny." Burdick, 504 U.S. at
433-44. The Court's allusions to Bullock are of consequence because the Court in
Bullock appeared intimately entrenched in the tiered scrutiny approach to analyzing
ballot restrictions and ultimately utilized a standard of heightened scrutiny. See
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147 (requiring a showing of necessity).
161 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 436-37. Hawaii's election statute provided three
mechanisms for obtaining access to the primary ballot: filing a petition containing
at least one percent of the State's registered voters; qualifying as an "established
party"; and qualifying via a designated nonpartisan ballot. See id. at 434-36.
163 See id. at 438-39.
164 Id. at 439 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986)).
165 Id.
160 Id. (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986)). Party
raiding is generally defined as "the organized switching of blocs of voters from one
party to another in order to manipulate the outcome of the other party's primary
election." Id. (citation omitted).
167 See id. at 440. Additionally, the Court announced that all future bans on write-
in voting will be presumptively valid if a state's ballot access laws pass constitutional
muster. See id. at 441.42.
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C. Candidate Qualifications as Distinct from Procedural Regulations:
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
Sections A and B analyzed the Supreme Court's treatment of state
statutes that indisputably constituted restrictions to ballot access.
The Court has also assessed the validity of state actions that, although
not formally examined under the rubric of ballot access, nevertheless
implicate the Court's ballot accessjurisprudence. In U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton,"e the Court addressed the constitutionality of an
amendment to the Arkansas Constitution which precluded persons
who had served a certain number of terms in the United States
Congress from having their names placed on the ballot for election
to Congress.1 69 The Court found that the constitutional qualifica-
tions for congressional service are "fixed" by the Constitution and
may not be supplemented by Congress or by the states.170 Thus,
while the amendment was facially crafted as a mere regulation of the
"Times, Places and Manner of Holding Elections"171 (and thus a
ballot access restriction), the Court held the amendment to be a
constitutionally invalid attempt to indirectly add qualifications for
congressional candidates.
1 72
In disposing of the term limit amendment as an impermissible
candidacy qualification, the Court had occasion to distinguish the
unalterability of the requirements for service enumerated in the
"Qualifications Clauses" from the regulatory powers delegated to the
States under the "Elections Clause."17 The Court thus observed
'68 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
11 The respondent challenged Section 3 of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas
Constitution which expressly acted to "'limit the terms of the elected officials.'" Id.
at 1845 (quoting the preamble to the amendment).
170 See id. at 1852-54. The Court rejected the argument that the states possessed
control over qualifications as part of the original powers reserved to them by the
Tenth Amendment. In so finding, the Court observed that the power to add qualifica-
tions necessarily was a right created by the Constitution and thus could not have
preexisted within the States prior to the establishment of the Constitution. See id. at
1854-56. Additionally, even assuming arguendo that the States possessed some
original power to add qualifications, the Framers clearly intended that the Constitu-
tion be the exclusive source of qualifications for members of Congress and thereby
divested the States of any inherent power to add qualifications. See id. at 1856-57.
171 Id. at 1867.
172 See id. at 1866-70 (stating that the amendment was simply an "'effort to dress
eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing'" while the "sole purpose of
[the amendment] was to... prevent the election of incumbents") (citation omitted).
173 The Court noted that in addition to the three qualifications set forth in Article
I, Section 2, other clauses may also be viewed as containing "qualifications" for the
members of Congress. See id. at 1847 n.2.
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that "[t]he Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States
authority to create procedural regulations, not to provide States with
license to exclude classes of candidates from federal office."
174
Nevertheless, as previously recognized, there necessarily exists an
inescapable tension in the distinction between categorically invalid
candidate eligibility qualifications and presumptively constitutional
procedural regulations. Despite the inevitably nebulous distinction
between the two classifications, the Court's choice in terminology-as
is often the case in constitutional doctrine-becomes dispositive.
Thus, while the term limits in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. were unques-
tionably candidacy qualifications, it is not immediately clear that the
disaffiliation requirements that the Court upheld in Storer which
substantively accomplished the task of excluding certain individuals
from the ballot, were "procedural" regulations as opposed to substan-
tive "qualifications."
Perhaps the most plausible distinction between the two lines of
jurisprudence lay in the Court's observation that its jurisprudence in
the area of the Elections Clause differentiated presumptively constitu-
tional "ballot access restrictions" from "qualifications" that are
inherently invalid as follows: The former do not "involve measures
that exclude candidates from the ballot without reference to the
candidates' [popular] support in the electoral process.
"'75
However, the Court's discussion in U.S. Term Limits of the Elections
Clause as granting solely "procedural" power to the states to regulate
elections may indicate the Court's intention to act less deferentially
when faced with future challenges to restrictive state ballot access
statutes.
174 Id. at 1869. As support for the Court's position that the Elections Clause
granted purely procedural power to the States, the Court referred toJames Madison,
who stated that the Clause granted states the power to determine "[w]hether the
electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place;
should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, should all vote for all the
representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district." Id.
(quoting 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 240 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)); see also THE FEDERAuT No. 60, at 871 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the Elections Clause "would be expressly
restricted to the regulation of the timas, the places, and the manner of elections").
I" U.S. Term Limits Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1870.
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IV. SURVEY OF RECENT LOWER COURT DECISIONS:
EVIDENCE OF CONFUSION
Part III served to illustrate the Supreme Court's tortuousjurispru-
dential history in the area of ballot access restrictions. This Part will
examine ballot access challenges reviewed by several lower federal
courts in 1995 and 1996. As will become evident, the courts had
considerable difficulty in discerning the proper method of analysis
suggested by the Supreme Court. The different approaches and
standards employed by these courts to assess the constitutional
validity of similar state regulations serves as further evidence of the
inconsistency endemic to the Supreme Court's analysis.
A. Fourth Circuit: McLaughlin v. North Carolina
Board of Elections
In McLaughlin v. North Carolina Board of Elections,17 6 supporters
of the Libertarian Party challenged the constitutionality of three
provisions of the North Carolina election scheme. 177 The Libertar-
ians challenged: 1) a provision mandating voter disaffiliation; 2) a
provision that a party "ceased to exist" if it failed to poll ten percent
of the vote; and 3) a requirement that organizers include a sign on
ballot access nominating petitions stating that "the signers of th[e]
petition intended to organize a new political party."178
In addressing this constitutional challenge, the Fourth Circuit
observed that "[tihe appropriate standard governing constitutional
challenges to specific provisions of state election laws begins with the
balancing test that the Supreme Court first set forth in Anderson v.
Celebrezze."179  However, the court interpreted the Supreme Court
116 65 F.Sd 1215 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
17 See id. at 1218-19. In relevant part, the North Carolina election code provided
that a "new party" could qualify for ballot access as a political party if it filed a petition
containing a number of signatures totalling "at least two percent of the total number
of votes cast in the most recent general election for [g]overnor." Additionally, an
'established party" was defined as one whose nominee for governor or president
secured at least ten percent of the total votes cast in the previous general election for
governor or president. One substantial benefit of securing the status of "established
party" was that such parties retained the right to appear on the ballot for state and
federal offices in the next general election without satisfying the petition requirement.
Notably, when a party failed to poll at least ten percent of the votes cast, it ceased to
be a "political party" within the meaning of the North Carolina election law and
would be forced to qualify as a "new party" again in the following election. Id. (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-96, -97, -122 (1994) (amended 1996)).
1" Id. at 1220 (emphasis omitted).
179 Id.
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in Burdick as having "modified" the Anderson balancing test, adding
the provision that "election laws which place 'severe' burdens upon
constitutional rights are subject to strict scrutiny."8 ' The court of
appeals illustrated this ambiguity, stating that "[in short, election
laws are usually, but not always,. subject to ad hoc balancing." 8 '
The Fourth Circuit resolved that a court should undergo a prelimi-
nary determination of the extent to which personal rights are
impinged by the state classification-if a regulation was deemed to
"severely" burden individual rights, then strict scrutiny would
properly be applied; otherwise, a balancing test would be appropri-
ate.
82
Applying this test to the North Carolina ballot access regulations,
the court found the restrictions to be "undoubtedly severe."
' 8
Nevertheless, after engaging in an exhaustive case-by-case comparison
with the Supreme Court's ballot access cases, the court of appeals
concluded that the provisions passed constitutional muster, evidently
finding the regulations to be the most narrowly tailored to meet the
state's compelling interest.
8 4
The court then assessed the constitutionality of the mandatory
language on the nominating petitions, finding initially that the
language served no legitimate state interest. 85 However, the court
also found it necessary to employ the Anderson balancing test to
determine whether the prescription burdened "protected rights."186
While the court did not require historical proof that protected rights
had in fact been invaded, the court did announce that the violation
of protected rights must be "the inevitable consequence" of state
actions in order to be held invalid. 8 7  As the language could
180 Id.
"I' Id. at 1221.
18 Id.
"' See id.
'8 See id. at 1221-26. Notably, as support for its analysis, the court cited Andemon
for the assertion that the Due Process Clause is offended by violations of the right to
associate. See id. at 1221. Additionally, the court noted that the "'right to form a
party for the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the
election ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes.'" Id. (quoting
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)). Remarkably, the court apparently
perceived no inconsistency in employing an equal protection analysis and a due
process analysis simultaneously. See id.
'85 See id. at 1226.
18 Id. at 1227.
187 Id.
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reasonably be construed in an innocuous manner, the court
concluded that the statute was constitutional.
188
Finally, the court addressed the mandatory disaffiliation require-
ment. Applying the Anderson balancing test, the court found that the
slight burden to the affected parties' associational rights was
overcome by the state's interests in administrative simplicity.'89
B. Sixth Circuit: Corrigan v. City of Newaygo
In 1995 the Sixth Circuit also had occasion to examine a ballot
access restriction scheme in Corrigan v. City of Newaygo.' 90 In
Corrigan petitioners asserted the unconstitutionality of a city
ordinance that denied ballot access to individuals who were delin-
quent on their local taxes or water and sewer fees.' 9' The court
first assessed the asserted infringement upon the freedom of
association, citing Anderson as an example of the "means-to-an-end
form of freedom of association" articulated in the Supreme Court's
decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.192 Failing to make any
reference to either a balancing test or a tiered scrutiny analysis, the
court simply analogized the facts to those present in Anderson and
concluded that no associational interest was infringed because the
tax ordinance was not directed at candidates with substantive views
that lie outside the platforms of existing political parties. 93 In
essence, the court determined that because the tax was not a content-
based form of political discrimination, it was not an impermissible
ballot access restriction.
Next, the court analyzed a possible equal protection violation
against those who were unable to pay the taxes and were thus barred
from ballot access. Noting an "unclear" Supreme Court history in
the area of wealth discrimination, the circuit court concluded that an
188 See id.
189 See id. at 1227-29.
190 55 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 379 (1995).
191 See id. at 1212-13. In May 1993, the Mayor of the City of Newaygo resigned
from office under pressure from several citizen groups. Two men, the petitioners in
this case, filed petitions to run for mayor. Three days after the filing deadline had
passed, the city clerk notified the individuals that they were ineligible to have their
names placed on the ballot due to outstanding financial obligations. One man owed
$372.63 in property taxes and $48.67 in water and sewer charges; the other man owed
$318.33 to the city in property taxes. The sole remaining candidate on the ballot was
the ex-mayor. See id.
112 See id. at 1215 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780; Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984)).
199 See id.
PRUNING THE POLITICAL THICKET
equal protection challenge was frivolous because no "protected class"
was precluded from seeking office.194  Despite one petitioner's
claim that the tax genuinely excluded him from the ballot due to his
inability to pay, the court concluded that "plaintiffs have asserted no
fundamental interest that would entitle them to protection as a
suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause."' Remarkably,
the court found that "we do not have to decide the proper standard
of review because this ordinance does not burden the rights of a class
entitled to protection under any standard." 9 ' Finding that only
protected classes are deserving of heightened scrutiny, the court
ignored any challenge based on the fundamental right of voting and
made no mention of a strict scrutiny analysis. The court determined
that the restrictions had a rational basis because the ordinance served
the legitimate economic purpose of enforcing the city's tax regime.
Finally, and most notably, the court attempted to address the
Anderson balancing test. The court stated:
It is unclear whether this means that there is a ballot access
potpourri of interests that potentially includes all of the numerous
interests protected by the concepts of freedom of association, equal
opportunity and privacy, and that all together they should be listed
and weighed to see if there is a combination that violates the Due
Process, Equal Protection and Free Speech clauses read together.
We have sought to view the matter in this way and do not find any
interests we have not taken into account in our separate analyses
under "freedom of association" and "Equal Protection." 197
Thus, in determining the constitutionality of the ballot access regime
in Corrigan, the Sixth Circuit undertook several independent equal
protection and due process analyses. Only then, in an obvious effort
to be respectful of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, did the court
make a symbolic attempt to fulfill the Anderson balancing test. As it
stated, the Sixth Circuit certainly remained "unclear" as to the impact
of Anderson. The court's reference to a nebulous "potpourri of
interests" to be balanced once again illustrates the ambiguity and
confusion created by the Supreme Court's decisions. 98
'9' See id. at 1216.
195 Id.
19 Id.
'1 Id. at 1217.
198 Id.
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C. Eighth Circuit: Republican Party v. Faulkner County
In 1995, the Eighth Circuit had occasion to apply the Supreme
Court's ballot access doctrine in Republican Party v. Faulkner Coun-
ty. 9' The Republican Party of Arkansas challenged the constitu-
tionality of an Arkansas statutory scheme that required political
parties to "both conduct and pay for primary elections as a condition
of access to the general election ballot.""' In assessing the validity
of the various state regulations, the court observed that "[t]he
Supreme Court has not spoken with unmistakable clarity on the
proper standard of review for challenges to provisions of election
codes."21 The court continued, stating that "[iun some cases, the
[Supreme] Court has articulated and employed a flexible test,
calibrating the level of scrutiny to the seriousness of the burden
imposed by the challenged law; yet on other occasions it has
suggested that all election and voting regulations must be subjected
to strict scrutiny."
202
The Eighth Circuit concluded that although it was not possible
to "resolve the[] apparently inconsistent standards of review," the
state regulations in the case before it constituted a "severe" burden
on individual liberties, warranting strict scrutiny "even under the
more flexible, sliding-scale standard of review articulated in
Burdick."20 3 Finally, the court rejected the four interests asserted
by the state,0 4 finding that "Arkansas ... failed to identify any
'9 49 F.d 1289 (8th Cir. 1995).
20 Id. at 1291.
201 Id. at 1296.
202 Id. The Eighth Circuit in Republican Party discussed the flexible, sliding-scale
standard announced in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1972), and employed
in Burdick v. Takush 504 U.S. 428, 432-34 (1992), Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479
U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986), and Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89. The court noted that in
Burdick, the Supreme Court found strict scrutiny appropriate when state regulations
"severely" restricted constitutional freedoms. Republican Party, 49 .3d at 1297 (citing
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
In addition, the court considered Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 222-33 (1989), for that case's finding that laws imposing "any
appreciable burden on rights of association, expression and voting demand[] strict
scrutiny." Republican Party, 49 F.3d at 1297.
In examining the Supreme Court's ballot accessjurisprudence, the Eighth Circuit
also noted that "[tihe precise standards of review [that the Supreme Court employed]
in the earliest election code cases cannot so readily be classified." Id. at 1297 n.3.
203 Republican Party, 49 F.3d at 1297.
20 Arkansas advanced the following state interests: "1) protecting and preserving
the integrity of the nominating process, 2) minimizing voter confusion, 3) protecting
the public from frivolous or fraudulent candidates, and 4) maximizing the probability
that the winning candidate will have received a majority of the popular vote." Id. at
PRUNING THE POLITICAL THICKET
compelling state interest which necessitates the imposition of such
heavy burdens on the associational rights of parties and voters," and
concluded that the state requirements were unconstitutional.0 5
D. Northern District of Georgia: Duke v. Cleland
In 1995, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
assessed the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that permitted the
State Candidate Selection Committee to delete any candidate's name
from the ballot if all Committee members of the same political party
voted to drop the name."' In Duke, all three Republican members
of the Committee voted to drop David Duke's name from the presi-
dential ballot and subsequently denied Duke's appeal for recon-
sideration.0 7
Ruling on counter motions for summary judgment, the district
court observed that its task, as defined by the Eleventh Circuit, was
to determine "with particularity the interests purportedly advanced
by [the Georgia statute and to] weigh them against the purported
burden upon the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, then apply the
proper level of scrutiny pursuant to the teachings of Anderson and
Burdick "2' Nevertheless, the district court's analysis consisted of
a methodical determination and examination of the respective
interests of the state and the individuals, followed by a strict scrutiny
review "for the sake of caution."
2 9
1299. While the court recognized these interests as "legitimate," it found that
Arkansas "fail[ed] to indicate how any of [the interests] necessitate[d] the burdens
imposed." Id.
205 Id. at 1301.
206 See Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995), affd sub nom. Duke v.
Massey, 87 E3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).207 In Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of a request for an injunction and temporary
restraining order that, if granted, would have prohibited the printing of ballots unless
Duke's name was listed. That decision merely determined, however, that the
Committee acted constitutionally in excluding Duke's name from the ballot, because
the Republican Party's right to define its membership outweighed both Duke's right
to associate with the party and citizens' rights to vote for Duke in the Republican
primary. See id. at 1530-33.
Duke and his supporters then amended their complaint to challenge the Georgia
statute itself, alleging that the statute violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The district court dismissed, finding a lack of state action. The Eleventh
Circuit in Duke v. Cleland, 5 .3d 1399 (11th Cir. 1993), held that the Committee's
action did constitute state action and remanded the case to the district court. See id.
at 1405-06. The present case concerns this issue.
203 Duke 884 F. Supp. at 514 (quoting Duke, 5 F.3d at 1405-06).
209 Id. at 517.
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The court found that the statute furthered the state's interest in
enhancing the expediency and efficiency of the electoral process.
The court also determined that the state's interest in "maintaining
and facilitating the Republican Party's ability to control its identity"
was "legitimate and compelling." 10 The court then undertook
separate analyses of the rights of voters and Duke's right to be a
candidate. The court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that voters
maintain an absolute right to vote for the candidate of their choice
and dismissed plaintiffs' claim of a right to vote for Duke as a
Republican (as opposed to voting for Duke as an independent).
Finally, the court found that Duke's right of association was not
infringed by the exclusion of his name from the ballot.
21 1
The decision in Duke is perhaps most notable for the court's
rationale and its use of the strict scrutiny test to determine the
constitutionality of the Georgia statute. Befuddled at the current
state of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue, the Northern
District of Georgia stated that "for the sake of caution, the court will
apply the strict scrutiny test to determine whether the statute was
'narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.'"212 The
delicate balance between advancing state interests in regulating the
ballot and protecting "our most precious freedoms" of association
and voting certainly deserves a more precise method of analysis than
application of a particular standard for no other reason than "for the
sake of caution."1 '
210 Id. at 515-16.
211 Id. at 516. The court regarded the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Duke v.
Cleland, 954 F2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992), as determining that Duke's right of
association was "not infringed by the decision of the" Committee. Duke, 884 F. Supp.
at 516. However, a more plausible interpretation may be that the Eleventh Circuit
merely found that the right of the Republican Party to define its membership
outweighed Duke's right of association. Under this interpretation, the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion implicitly recognized the existence of Duke's right of association,
without determining the expansiveness of the right.212 Duke, 884 F. Supp. at 517 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433
(1992)). Ultimately, the Court in Duke upheld the statute, finding that it was narrowly
tailored to advance the state's compelling interest in allowing parties to choose their
candidates. See id. at 517-18.
213 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (observing the "precious rights"
of association and voting implicated by ballot access restrictions).
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E. Southern District of New York: Gelb v. Board of Elections
In Gelb v. Board of Election, 214 the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York addressed the constitutionality of actions
and omissions of the New York Board of Elections during the 1993
primary and general election for the office of Bronx Borough Presi-
dent.21 Remarkably, in evaluating the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the district court observed that "the Supreme Court has
rejected the application of strict scrutiny to every voting rights case.
Instead, a flexible standard of review is employed."
216
The district court then analogized the plaintiffs complaint to the
constitutional challenges asserted in Williams v. Rhodes, and held that
"[bly allegedly engaging in acts and omissions designed to under-
mine write-in candidacies, the effect of defendants' actions was to
bolster the candidacies of people nominated by the established
parties."" 7 The district court apparently interpreted all Supreme
Court ballot access cases as employing the Anderson balancing test,
despite the Supreme Court's use of a more stringent standard in Wil-
liams and Illinois State Board of Elections.218  Further, the District
Court in Gelb was evidently so confident that strict scrutiny was
inappropriate in the area of ballot access that it cavalierly chose to
analogize the facts of Gelb to Williams, instead of another Supreme
Court case that more clearly utilized the flexible standard, such as
Anderson or Munro.
F. Eastern District of New York: Rockefeller v. Powers
In Rockefeller v. Powers,2" 9 the Eastern District of New York
granted a preliminary injunction to registered Republican voters who
asserted that New York state election laws and Republican Party rules
regulating the nominating petition process violated the First Amend-
ment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.20 The district court interpreted the Supreme Court's juris-
214 888 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
215 See id. The plaintiff did not question the constitutionality of the statutory
scheme itself, but rather asserted that the actions of the Board of Elections deprived
him and others of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. at
511-13.
210 Id. at 515 (citation omitted).
217 Id. at 517.
218 See supra Part III.
219 909 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd, 74 F.3d 1367 (2d Cir. 1995), ert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1703, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996).
220 See id. at 872. As applied to the Republican Party, the New York law requires
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prudence as a formulation of "two distinct lines of analysis" repre-
senting due process and equal protection challenges.22' Thus, the
Eastern District of New York asserted that "[r] egulations that impose
burdens that are generally applicable to all voters are usually treated
deferentially under a balancing test."222 The court stated that "[iun
contrast, the cases dealing with requirements that treat similarly
situated voters differently have imposed a more probing, less deferen-
tial level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."221 Conse-
quently, the court found that "[w] here the difference is de minimis,
only a rational basis is required. Where it 'impairs the voters' ability
to express their political preferences,' heightened scrutiny is re-
quired."
24
The district court in Rockefeller declared that "[t] he leading case
analyzing ballot access signature requirements under the Equal
Protection Clause is Illinois State Board of Elections."2  The court
reasoned that "[i ] n the context of [primary elections], candidates
who are independent of the party organization are.., analogous to
third parties at a general election" and concluded that the different
burdens required by the New York scheme "raise exactly the same
question ... here as in [Illinois State Board of Elections v.] Socialist
Workers Party."226 Thus, the district court found that "[u]nder any
test-strict scrutiny, balancing of interests, or rational basis-the
rules at issue here, which have the practical effect of limiting voters'
choices and curtailing political expression, cannot be sustained."
227
Interpreting the lower court to have applied strict scrutiny to
strike down the state's registration requirement, the Second Circuit
determined that "the district court was incorrect to conclude, as it
that delegate candidates secure signatures totaling the lesser of five percent or 1250
enrolled party members in their districts in order to have their names placed on the
primary ballot. Due to disparities in population and the distribution of Republicans
in the various districts, the requirement imposes on candidates substantially different
burdens corresponding with different districts. See id. at 864 (citing Act of Aug. 8,
1995 N.Y. Laws 586). The court observed that only six congressional districts
contained fewer than 25,000 Republicans and thus forced candidates to comply with
the full five percent requirement; however in 20 of the districts, the 1250 signature
cap resulted in an operative signature requirement of 1.54% or less. See id. at 864-65.
221 Id. at 865.
2M Id.
222 Id. at 866.
' Id. (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184 (1979)).
= Id.
26 Id. at 868-69.
227 Id. at 869.
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apparently did, that the broad language of [Illinois State Board of
Elections v.] Socialist Workers Party automatically requires strict scrutiny
for ballot access measures that result in any sort of disparate treat-
ment."28 The court of appeals apparently found that the Supreme
Court had made ballot access jurisprudence "clear," stating that:
The critical question ... is "the extent to which a challenged
regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment [voting]
rights."...
... [I]f ballot access rules affected two groups of people
differently, such that different "appreciable" (or "significant," or
"substantial," or "severe") burdens were imposed on the fundamen-
tal right to vote of the two groups, then strict scrutiny would ap-
ply.
22
Imposing this test, the Second Circuit found that "the evidence [did]
not indicate a causal connection between the challenged regulation
and the alleged injury. "211 Concluding that plaintiff's right to vote
was "certainly not 'preclu [ded]' ... [nor] significantly burden [ed],"
the court applied a "rational basis analysis." 23' Not surprisingly, the
court then determined several legitimate governmental interests to
which the registration requirements were rationally related and
summarily reversed the district court and vacated the injunction.
232
' Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 E3d 1367, 1377 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1703, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996).
' Id. at 1378 n.16 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)) (first
alteration in original).
I Id. at 1379. The court found: 1) that no correlation existed between the
districts with less than two candidates on the ballot and the number of registered
Republicans in those districts; 2) that the plaintiffs argument was flawed because it
relied on the choice of presidential candidates available to primary voters in different
districts, while in reality, each district voted for delegates to the national convention-
not for presidential candidates; 3) that registered Republicans in districts with fewer
registered Republicans actually received a "substantial benefit" because of the relative
power of their votes. Id. at 1379-81.
231 Id. at 1382 (first alteration in original).
252 See id. at 1382-83 (identifying the state's interest in weeding out candidates with
insufficient support and its countervailing interest in protecting potential candidates
in districts where an across-the-board percentage requirement would be unduly
burdensome).
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G. Summary of Lower Court Decisions
Illustrating the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of chal-
lenges to state ballot access restrictions and the subsequent lack of
clear precedential effect to federal judges and state legislatures, Part
IV presented recent decisions of various lower federal courts. In
McLaughlin, the Fourth Circuit determined that the appropriate
standard to examine ballot access restrictions was a "modified"
Anderson balancing test.233  When presented with a similar state
regulation in Corrigan, the Sixth Circuit simply analogized the facts
of Anderson to the instant fact pattern and cursorily noted the "un-
clear" standard of review suggested by the Supreme Court.2 4 The
Eighth Circuit remained unable to "resolve [the] ... inconsistent
standards of review," noting that "[i]n some cases, the [Supreme]
Court has articulated and employed a flexible test ... yet on other
occasions it has suggested that all election and voting regulations
must be subjected to strict scrutiny.1233  Similarly uncertain as to
the proper methodology or standard, the Northern District of
Georgia utilized a strict scrutiny standard "for the sake of caution" in
Duke v. Cleland.23 6 On the other hand, the Southern District of
NewYork confidently asserted that the Supreme Court had "rejected
the application of strict scrutiny to every voting rights case" and
instead employed a "flexible standard" in Gelb v. Board of Elec-
tions.217 The Eastern District of New York observed in Rockefeller v.
Powers that the Supreme Court cases constituted two distinct lines of
analysis. 238 Thus, the Southern District of New York resolved that
for substantive due process challenges, it is proper to employ a
balancing test; however, for equal protection challenges, a "more
probing, less deferential level of scrutiny" is appropriate. 219 The
Second Circuit disagreed and in overruling the Southern District,
declared that the level of scrutiny to be applied depended upon the
2" See supra Part V.A.
2 See supra Part I.B.
Republican Party v. Faulkner County, 49 F.3d 1289, 1296-97 (8th Cir. 1995); see
also supra Part P.C.
2 884 F Supp. 511, 517 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see also supra Part IV.D.
"7 888 F. Supp. 509, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citation omitted); see also supra Part
W.E.
' See Rockefeller v. Powers, 909 F Supp. 868 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd, 74 F.Sd 1867
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1703, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996); see
also supra Part V.E
2 Id. at 865-66.
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"extent to which a challenged regulation burden[ed]" protected
voting rights. 40
Within one year, seven different federal courts undertook seven
vastly different methods of analysis in assessing substantially similar
state regulations. This summary makes abundantly clear that perhaps
the only element of this area of law on which the various courts
concur is the lack of clarity supplied by the Supreme Court.
V. ANALYSIS
Assuming arguendo that the Court will continue to analyze
alleged violations of equal protection and substantive due process
within the framework of tiered scrutiny, ballot access restrictions
should be examined through the lens of strict scrutiny. Access
restrictions necessarily implicate the freedom of political association
and the right to vote, both of which have been accepted by the Court
to be fundamental in character.241  Because strict scrutiny was
created to be the mechanism with which to examine state regulations
which burden fundamental rights, it is logically inconsistent and
intuitively imprudent for the Court to deny this heightened scrutiny
to two of our "most precious freedoms." 42  The Court should
employ a method of analysis that recognizes the fundamental nature
of the individual rights infringed and enables states to effectively
regulate the process of elections. Utilizing a genuine and nonconclu-
sory tiered scrutiny analysis that accords appropriate weight to the
states' objectives in regulating the ballot and the individual constitu-
tional interests infringed will accomplish these objectives.
2 43
2140 Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F3d 1367, 1377 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1703, and cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996).
241 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text; but see Gardner, supra note 3
(manuscript at 3, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (observing that
"[fln a contradiction unparalleled in constitutional law, the Court has said both that
the Constitution 'undeniably' protects the right to vote in state and federal elec-
tions-and that the right to vote 'is not a constitutionally protected right'").
24 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
243 The Court's reasoning in many of the ballot access cases implies that use of a
strict scrutiny standard must result in an invalidation of the state law. For example,
Justice White's observation in Burdik v. Takushi that all election laws must necessarily
"'affect[] ... the individual's right to vote and his right to associate,'" led him to the
conclusion that "to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that
the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest... would
tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and
efficiently." 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
788 (1983)). Consequently, the Court in Burdick employed a "more flexible standard"
than strict scrutiny. Id. at 434. However, see infra notes 265-71 and accompanying
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A. Proposed Test
As Part IV illustrated, lower courts are confused as to the appro-
priate method of evaluating the constitutionality of state election
schemes. The Supreme Court should announce a clear and coherent
standard that will enable courts to analyze ballot access restrictions
consistently and will provide states with a higher degree of confi-
dence in the validity of their election laws. The history of the
Court's analysis indicates two distinct areas of confusion that must be
resolved. First, the Court should distinguish instances where an
equal protection analysis is appropriate from instances where a due
process analysis is appropriate. Because this is a modest doctrinal
matter that has been previously reconciled, the Court should simply
apply the appropriate standards consistently. Second, the Court
should determine whether a balancing test or a tiered scrutiny
analysis244 is appropriate to analyzing ballot access restrictions.
While a balancing test may appear to provide courts with greater
leeway to evaluate competing interests, courts may also capture this
benefit in a system of tiered scrutiny which accurately measures
states' and individuals' respective interests. Furthermore, a system
of tiered scrutiny provides a more coherent and administrable
standard to lower courts and tends to afford a more appropriate level
of deference to state legislative enactments. Finally, because the
Court continues to use a tiered scrutiny analysis in other equal
protection and due process challenges, the Court should employ
such a method when evaluating ballot access restrictions.
1. Due Process v. Equal Protection
Prior to its decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze,245 the Supreme
Court analyzed all ballot access restrictions under the rubric of equal
protection analysis.246 However, as it noted cavalierly in a footnote,
the Anderson Court did not "engage in a separate Equal Protection
Clause analysis," but instead utilized a substantive due process analy-
text for the argument that use of strict scrutiny will not necessarily be inconsistent with
a finding that state election schemes are constitutionally valid.
24 The Court traditionally employed a "two-tiered" model of review. A state statute
was either subjected to "rational basis" or "strict scrutiny." Subsequently, the Court
added a "middle-level of scrutiny." See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text
(evidencing the Court's continued adherence to a tiered system).
245 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
246 See supra Part III.A.
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sis.247 This subsequently left observers and lower courts with consid-
erable doubt as to the appropriate method of analysis. Nevertheless,
despite lower courts' understandable confusion regarding whether
substantive due process or equal protection is the correct form of
analysis in the area of ballot access, as a general doctrinal matter, the
appropriate application of either substantive due process or equal
protection is a rather fundamental concept and should not be
problematic. As the district court in Rockefeller stated, "[r] egulations
that impose burdens that are generally applicable to all voters" must
be examined under the Due Process Clause to determine "whether
[the regulations] place[] too great a restriction on ballot access,
regardless of the burdens imposed [on voters] in other districts.
248
Alternatively, "requirements that treat similarly situated voters
differently" must be evaluated under the Equal Protection
Clause.249
While this settles the issue from a theoretical perspective, as a
practical matter the Court must still determine whether a state
regulation that burdens a minor party or an independent candidate
constitutes an equal protection violation or a due process infringe-
ment. A due process challenge may be validly asserted whenever
constitutional rights are infringed.25 ' Accordingly, in discussing the
substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,251 Justice O'Connor stated that the Due
Process Clause "has been understood to .. . 'bar[] certain govern-
ment actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.' 25 2 Because ballot access restrictions implicate
247 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786-87 n.7.
248 Rockefeller v. Powers, 909 F. Supp. 863, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd, 74 F.d 1367
(2d Cir. 1995), cerl. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1703, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996).
24 Id. at 866. The district court in Rockefelilerwas, however, careful to note that the
Supreme Court often failed to distinguish between these two analytical inquiries. See
id. at 865 n.1. Additionally, note justice Harlan's observation in Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969):
[When] a classification is based upon the exercise of rights guaranteed
against state infringement by the Federal Constitution, then there is no need
for any resort to the Equal Protection Clause; in such instances, this Court
may properly and straightforwardly invalidate any undue burden upon those
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Id. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
250 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 661-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
-1 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 661-62 (Harlan,J., dissenting)
(stating that"[w]hen the right affected is one assured by the Federal Constitution, any
infringement can be dealt with under the Due Process Clause").
z2 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
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the fundamental rights to vote and to associate, courts may reason-
ably analyze challenges to state regulations under the aegis of
substantive due process.
Alternatively, as Professor Tribe has observed, "equality can be
denied when government classifies so as to distinguish... between
persons who should be regarded as similarly situated in terms of the
relevant equal protection principles."2 53 Thus, parties may also
appropriately assert ballot access challenges under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The appropriate inquiries under such a test would be
whether supporters of minority parties and independent candidates
are "similarly situated" with supporters of majority parties and
whether they are treated "differently" in a manner that the Constitu-
tion is bound to respect.254
Unquestionably, the applicability of the Due Process Clause or
the Equal Protection Clause to determine the constitutionality of a
state ballot access restriction will, to a certain extent, depend upon
the particularities of the state regulation. Nevertheless, while the
burdens imposed by different state ballot access laws are distinct, the
laws themselves will undoubtedly burden the rights of voters who
support minority parties and independent candidates, and in this
respect will be equivalent. Therefore, the Supreme Court may
effectively and conclusively determine this issue by declaring either
253 TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1438.
4 Recall that the Court has refused to acknowledge a distinct fundamental right
of candidacy. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 184, 142-43 (1972); TRIBE, supra note 2,
at 1098.
Clearly, supporters of a minority party or an independent candidate are being
treated "differently," in the colloquial sense, by a state election law that requires such
political entities to submit to different standards than established or majority parties.
In several important respects, however, supporters of such parties are not treated
differently. First, the particular parties themselves are not subject to adverse
treatment in the sense that the regulations apply to all parties. The current minority
parties are simply those that happen to fall into the category of "minority" party at
one specific point in time. These parties, however, may soon become "majority" or
"established" parties and thus will no longer be subject to the "different" treatment;
similarly, the current "majority" parties may fall out of favor and become subject to
the "different" treatment. Second, the supporters of minority parties are not treated
differently in the respect that state statutes are facially neutral and do not discriminate
on the basis of specific political beliefs. Thus, the voters are not treated differently
because of their "radical" beliefs, but rather because they are relatively unsupported
in their beliefs to such a degree that ballot access may be unwarranted. Professor
Tribe thus states that not every "political outcome which operates to an individual's
disadvantage should be deemed to deny treatment as an equal, but only to single out
for special scrutiny and probable invalidation those disadvantageous political judge-
ments which seem likely to reflect a preference based on prejudice." Id. at 1438.
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that such statutory schemes are to be dealt with in a due process
context or in an equal protection context. 5' In short, regardless
of which approach the Court adopts, it must do so consistently.
25 6
2. Tiered Scrutiny
As many recent decisions evidence, the Supreme Court has
maintained its use of a tiered scrutiny approach to analyze allegations
of substantive due process and equal protection violations.5 7
I It should be clear, however, that analysis under the Due Process Clause is
distinct from analysis under the Equal Protection Clause and in certain instances only
one constitutional protection is available. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying
text (explaining the applicability of due process and equal protection challenges to
distinct infringements of constitutional liberties as articulated by the Eastern District
of New York in Rockefeller v. Powers, 909 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd, 74 F.3d
1367 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1703, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704
(1996).
156 Note however that the applicability of the two constitutional protections is not
necessarily mutually exclusive. See Rockefeller 909 F Supp. at 866 (illustrating that "a
restriction that would withstand a Due Process/First Amendment challenge, could
nonetheless fail to survive a challenge made under the Equal Protection Clause, if not
applied uniformly").
For a lengthy discussion of the importance of consistency, seeJustice O'Connor's
opinion in Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (stating that "the very concept of the rule of law
underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time").
17 See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny and
concluding that Georgia's legislative redistricting plan violated equal protection);
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (holding that although lawyers'
solicitation constituted commercial speech, the Florida Bar's 30-day ban on targeted
direct mail solicitation withstood intermediate scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that all race-based classifications, whether
state or federal, benign or malign, must be subjected to strict scrutiny, and remanding
challenge of federal highway program designed to encourage participation of
disadvantaged classes in highway construction contracts); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc, v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (holding that "must-carry" provisions of Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 were subject to intermediate level
of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions on speech); Smith v. Shalala, 5
F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[b]ecause [a] classification based on
marital status does not involve a suspect class... [the Court] must examine it under
the rational basis test"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 198 (1994).
While the death of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding constitu-
tionally invalid a New York law that limited the working hours of bakery employees
as an abridgement of the "liberty of contract"), brought about by the decisions in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (sustaining a New York regulatory scheme for
fixing milk prices) and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding
state minimum wage laws for women) signaled the demise of substantive due process
in the economic realm, it is clear that the Court continues to view the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a restraint on a state's power to infringe
personal liberties protected by the first 10 amendments. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 848
(stating that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the
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Therefore, assuming that the Court will continue to employ this
methodology in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence, it is
logically consistent and intuitively reasonable to assert that the Court
should employ such a method in the area of ballot access jurispru-
dence as well. 5
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects").
" But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall,J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court's usage of "neat categories which dictate
the appropriate standard of review" in favor of a "reasoned approach").
Discussion concerning the use of a balancing test instead of a tiered-scrutiny
system seems to result from the often conclusory aspect of the latter method. See
supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (noting that the conclusory nature of the
Court's reasoning in many of the ballot access cases led to the creation of a more
flexible standard). Justice Marshall also expressed frustration with tiered scrutiny in
his dissent in Dandridge v. Williams:
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably advanced
by the a priori definition of a 'right,' fundamental [and thus invoking the
.compelling state interest" test] or otherwise. Rather, concentration must
be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the govern-
mental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in
support of the classification.
397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Justice Marshall's attack on the tiered-scrutiny system continued in his dissent in
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-110. Marshall's concerns were twofold: First, in many
instances strict scrutiny was "strict in theory but fatal in fact," Adarand v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097, 2100 (1995), thus making the determination of standards dispositive of
the larger constitutional question. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 98-99 (Marshall, J.,
disagreeing with the Court's rigid equal protection analysis). Second, strict scrutiny
was reserved for "suspect classes" and "fundamental rights." Id. at 99 ("I ... cannot
accept ... that fundamental interests, which call for strict scrutiny of the challenged
classification, encompass only established rights which we are somehow bound to
recognize from the text of the Constitution itself."). But, as the Court's internal
debates concerning the validity of substantive due process to protect rights beyond
those explicitly enumerated in the text of the Constitution attest, finding a liberty to
be "fundamental" in the constitutional sense often has little to do with the societal or
immediate importance of the liberty. See id. at 33-34 ("[T]he key to discovering
whether education is fundamental is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education .... [but] [r]ather ... whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.").
Thus, the combination of a conclusory system of tiered scrutiny and restrictive
access to heightened scrutiny ledJustice Marshall to conclude that this regime would
lead to anomalous results-state regulations affecting significant and perhaps life-
determinative rights could be found to affect only "nonfundamental" interests and
thus upheld, while state regulations implicating "fundamental" rights but having only
a trivial impact on any individual liberties would be struck down. Not surprisingly,
Justice Marshall favored a "sliding scale" of scrutiny which would not only balance the
state and individual interests, but also would invoke a level of scrutiny relative to the
nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the individual liberty
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Assuming that the Court should employ a tiered-scrutiny
approach to constitutional challenges of ballot access schemes, strict
scrutiny is undeniably the appropriate standard by which to protect
the "fundamental" rights which laws dealing with the electoral
process necessarily implicate. First, even as the Court announced the
balancing test in Anderson v. Celebrezze,259 it conceded that state
election codes "inevitably affect[] ... the individual's right to vote
and his right to associate with others for political ends."26 The
Court has unambiguously recognized the fundamental character of
the right to vote and the right of association. 61 Because the Court
implicated. See id. at 99.
In light of the Court's more recent jurisprudence, both of Justice Marshall's
concerns seem unwarranted. First, the Court has declared and demonstrated that
strict scrutiny is notfatal in fact. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 ("[W]e wish to dispel
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" (citation omitted));
infra note 282 and accompanying text; see also Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973)
(per curiam) (applying strict scrutiny and accepting state regulations that required a
50-day durational voter residency); Martson v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per
curiam) (applying heightened scrutiny and upholding 50-day voter residency and
registration requirements for non-presidential elections); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny and sustaining a military order excluding
Americans of Japanese origin from West Coast areas following Pearl Harbor); see
generally TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1451-52. Second, ballot access restrictions necessarily
implicate the fundamental rights of voting and association, thus eliminating any
question as to the appropriateness of strict scrutiny in this context. See supra notes 48-
49 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental rights implicated by ballot
access restrictions). Consequently, any concerns that a proper measuring of interests
and weighing of liberties will not take place under a system of tiered scrutiny are
unfounded.
Finally, because the Court has employed a tiered-scrutiny analysis in other areas
of equal protection and substantive due process, it is logically consistent and appropri-
ate for the Court to also utilize such a regime in the context of ballot access restric-
tions. See generally infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text (noting the need for
consistency in reviewing laws that infringe upon fundamental rights); supra note 256
and accompanying text (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 833, 854, for the proposition that
the Court must maintain jurisprudential consistency).
9 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
260 Id. at 788.
261 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) ("[T]he right of individuals to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters...
to cast their votes effectively..., rank among our most precious freedoms."). The
Court has also stated that because "suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society [and] is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringnent ... must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Court in Reynolds noted that to "the extent that a citizen's right
to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen." Id. at 567. Similarly, the Court has
stated that "[n] o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
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has consistently applied the strict-scrutiny standard to challenges of
laws which infringe fundamental rights, the Court should view all
ballot access restrictions through the veil of heightened scrutiny. 262
In order to demonstrate the validity of the above assertion, I will
address the two most compelling justifications for the application of
a lesser standard than strict scrutiny. Onejustification, that the right
of association and the right to vote are somehow less than "funda-
mental" in the context of ballot access law, has been explicitly
rejected by the Court in the course of its ballot access jurispru-
dence.2 63 The other possible justification is that a heightened level
of scrutiny would inevitably lead to undesirable results. 2  While
the Court has rejected this rationale in other areas of law, it evidently
failed to fully appreciate the implications of its prior decisions on
ballot access jurisprudence.
The Court's hesitancy to apply strict scrutiny to all infringements
of fundamental rights is based on the realization that governmental
regulations may infringe fundamental rights indirectly or in merely
a de minimis fashion. Therefore, strict scrutiny may be excessively
harsh as applied to such regulations. 2 Alternatively, non-funda-
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). But see Gardner supra note 3
(manuscript at 3, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (citing
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) and San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973)) for a discussion of the Court's contradictory
declarations regarding constitutional protection of the right to vote.
262 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (stating
that the Court has "long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined"); Reynolds, 377 U.S.
at 561-62 (stating that because "the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter.., any
alleged infringement ... must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized"); see also
TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1454 ("Legislative and administrative classifications are to be
strictly scrutinized and thus held unconstitutional absent a compelling governmental
justification if they distribute benefits or burdens in a manner inconsistent with
fundamental rights.").
26 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
26 See supra note 258 (noting the fear of anomalous results voiced by Justice
Marshall inherent in a system of tiered scrutiny).
26 For example, in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992), the Court stated
that "[i]t is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the most fundamental significance under
our constitutional structure'[but i]t does not follow... that the right to vote in any
manner and the right to associate for political purposes through the ballot are
absolute." Id. at 433 (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184 (1979)). The Court then reasoned that, because "[e]lection laws will
invariably impose some burden upon individual voters.... to subject every voting
regulation to strict scrutiny. . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that
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mental rights may be greatly burdened by state regulations, thus
implying that the rational basis test may be insufficient. Never-
theless, the Court repeatedly has declared that a proper application
of the tiered scrutiny regime does not necessarily lead to inapposite
results as long as the determination of the standard is not conclusory.
For example, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,2"' the Court
rejected the use of an intermediate standard of review for congressio-
nally mandated "benign" racial classifications in favor of strict
scrutiny. 67 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, declared that
"all racial classifications ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny" and that consistent standards must be applied
in all instances of race-based laws." 'herefore, Adarand specifical-
ly stands for the proposition that the Court must maintain a
consistent standard of review for laws that infringe fundamental
rights, regardless of the degree of infringement on individual rights
or the extent of the state objectives furthered. Accordingly,
"wish [ing] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory,
but fatal in fact,'"" 9 the Court declared:
The principle of consistency simply means that whenever the
government treats any person unequally because of his or her race,
that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the
language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection. It says nothing about the ultimate validity of any
particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying
strict scrutiny. The principle of consistency explains the circum-
stances in which the inquiry requiring strict scrutiny occurs. The
application of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of that
injury.2
7 0
elections are operated equitably and efficiently." Id. Thus, the Court in Burdick
apparently assumed that any application of strict scrutiny would necessarily result in
a finding that the state election scheme was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, as will be
argued below, application of strict scrutiny is not inherently inconsistent with a
finding that the rights to associate and to vote are overcome by compelling state
interests.
260 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
267 See id. at 2112 (stating that only a strict scrutiny standard can assure that
"important legislative goals are pursued by using a racial classification and that the
means chosen closely fit these goals").
268 Id. at 2113.
2
1 Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring)).
270 Id. at 2114.
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It is simply not necessary that the Court employ a balancing test
in order to "weigh[] all [of the appropriate] factors [and] decide
whether the challenged [ballot access restriction] is unconstitution-
al."27 Rather, the application of strict scrutiny will enable a Court
to make a proper determination of the constitutionality of ballot
access restrictions. The Court simply cannot bury its head in the sand
and ignore the totality of its equal protectionjurisprudence. Because
ballot access restrictions implicate "fundamental" rights, the
application of strict scrutiny is required.
B. Rights Asserted
Having established in Section A that a proper equal protection
analysis compels the employment of heightened scrutiny to challeng-
es of state ballot access regulations, this Section will briefly illustrate
the respective rights of the state and the individual that may be
implicated by such state regulations.
1. Individual Interests
State ballot schemes that restrict access to minority and indepen-
dent candidates implicate the rights of those candidates. Neverthe-
less, because the Court has not recognized candidacy as a fundamen-
tal right, assertions of burdened candidacy alone will not be
sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny.2 72 However, as the Supreme
Court stated in Bullock v. Carter, "the rights of voters and the rights
of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that
affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative
effect on voters."
273
' Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
272 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972) ("The initial and direct
impact of [ballot access restrictions] is felt by aspirants for office, rather than voters,
and the Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as
to invoke a rigorous standard of review."); see also Clements v. Fashing, 547 U.S. 957,
963 (1982) (plurality opinion) (finding that "the existence of barriers to a candidate's
access to the ballot does not of itself compel close scrutiny"). Professor Tribe
observed that "although groups of voters have a right to associate and advance a
candidate to represent their interests, these associational rights do not seem to require
that any particular individual serve as that candidate." TRIBE supra note 2, at 1098 n.5.
In addition, Professor Tribe noted that it would be peculiar for the Court to find
fundamental an "activity [such as candidacy, that is] bound to be unthinkable for a
vast majority of [society]." Id.
273 Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143. But the Court also found that "not every limitation or
incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard
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As discussed above, the Court announced in Anderson v. Celebrezze
that state election codes "inevitably affect[] ... the individual's right
to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends."
74
Consequently, the Court has recognized that the rights of association
and voting are necessarily implicated by ballot access restrictions. As
illustrated in Part III, the Court has consistently recognized the
fundamental character of these rights.
2 75
Additionally, the Court has recognized the "significant role that
third parties have played in the political development of the Na-
tion."2 76 Further, because the Court has found that "an election
campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining
political office," access restrictions may be viewed as infringing
political expression.277
Even if ballot access restrictions do not infringe the fundamental
rights of association and voting, the Court could arguably employ
strict scrutiny in its analysis of state election laws dealing with third
parties and independent candidates because such regulations burden
a protected class of citizens. Accordingly, while inquiring into
"'whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily
burden[ed] the 'availability of political opportunity,"'273 the Court
of review." Id. But see supra Part VA (arguing that the Court should employ strict
scrutiny to analyze all burdens on the exercise of the fundamental rights of voting and
association).
' Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. For a separate discussion of the freedom of
association, see Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE LJ. 1, 2 (1964) (observing that NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) "elevated [the] freedom of association to an independent right, possessing an
equal status with the other rights specifically enumerated in the First Amendment").
I" See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text (listing cases in which the Court
acknowledged the fundamental nature of the rights to vote and associate for political
ends).
276 Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185-86 (1979)
("Abolitionists, Progressives, and Populists have undeniably had influence, if not
always electoral success.").
277 Id. at 186; see a[soALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINuITY 79-80 (1971)
(stating that minor parties are indispensable for disseminating new ideas and that
their existence is constitutionally protected); WILFRED E. BINKLEY, AMERICAN POLITICAL
PARTIEs 181-82 (3d ed. 1958) (noting that the Abolitionists and other third parties
emerged when the major parties failed to placate their own dissident members);
HOWARD R. PENNIMAN, SAT'SAMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELEcrIONs 238-39 (5th
ed. 1952) ("[T]he true function of minor parties is to bring forward new policies,
[and t]hrough them, sectional interests that cannot be reconciled with the existing
combination of interest in the major parties may find expression ....").
" Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964
(1982) (quoting Lubin v. Parish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) (quotation marks
omitted))).
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in Anderson alluded to the seminal footnote number four in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. and its discussion of the impact of state
regulations on discrete and insular minorities.27 9 While the Ander-
son Court-after finding that burdens on minority political parties or
independent candidates "by [their] very nature," impinge on First
Amendment rights-used a balancing test to invalidate the state
election scheme, the Court could simply treat laws directed at the
politically disaffected as presumptively subject to a strict scrutiny
equal protection analysis.280
2. State Interests
Strict scrutiny requires that "classifications, imposed by [a]
federal, state, or local governmental actor.., are constitutional only
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests."28 ' Thus, in order for a state ballot access
279 Seesupra note 137 and accompanying text. The Court in Carolene Products stated
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938). See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) ("As a
historical matter... [strict scrutiny is given to those groups that exhibit] obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and
they are.., a minority or politically powerless.").
In addition, Professor Tribe observed that special judicial protection is given to
those groups which, "because of widespread, insistent prejudice against them," occupy
the position of "perennial losers in the political struggle." TRIBE, supra note 2, at
1454.
"0 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793-94. In effect, the Court implied that because minority
parties and independent candidacies are established as alternatives to the "main-
stream" views espoused by the two major parties, their supporters necessarily are not
represented by the major parties. Thus, any state regulations that treat such groups
in a disparate manner are not afforded the traditional presumption of reasonableness
attributed to the legislative process as an enactment of the popular will. But since the
Court in Anderson employed a balancing test to invalidate the Ohio statute, it had no
occasion to consider whether the regulation would indeed receive strict scrutiny due
to its impact on the politically disaffected.
21 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (finding that
strict scrutiny must be applied even to "benign" racial classifications imposed by the
federal government); see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966) (stating that the Court has "long been mindful that where fundamental rights
and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which
might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined");
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (stating that "the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter" and that "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized"); TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1454
(stating that "[legislative and administrative classifications are to be strictly
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regime that infringes the fundamental rights of association and
voting to be found constitutional, the reviewing court must deter-
mine first that the state objectives furthered are indeed "compelling,"
and second that the actual regulation was less restrictive of individu-
als' constitutional rights than other available alternatives. Although
these determinations must be made in the context of a justiciable
controversy and in light of the relevant circumstances, it is possible
to discuss state interests that may potentially rise to a compelling lev-
el.282 Accordingly, this subsection will briefly describe certain state
interests that may be sufficient to support a state regulation that
infringes upon fundamental rights.
283
As an initial matter, the Court has clearly recognized that "there
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany
the democratic process."284 Accordingly, the Court has permitted
many state regulations that serve to improve the effectiveness of the
electoral system. However, the Court has recently underscored the
procedural nature of state electoral schemes: "[ T] he Framers under-
stood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural
regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral out-
scrutinized and thus held unconstitutional absent a compelling governmental
justification if they distribute benefits or burdens in a manner inconsistent with
fundamental rights").
I See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (noting that decisions
concerning the validity of ballot access restrictions are "very much a 'matter of
degree,' very much a matter of 'considering the facts and circumstances behind the
law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those
who are disadvantaged by the classification'") (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 348 (1972) and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) respectively).
" For a more significant treatment of the states' rights furthered by state ballot
access restrictions, see Smith, supra note 14, at 178-93 (concluding that state interests
in assuring majority winners, maintaining political stability, avoiding voter confusion,
discouraging frivolous candidates, and avoiding clogged voting machinery are not
meaningfully advanced by ballot access restrictions); see alsoJudith L. Elder, Access To
the Ballot by Political Candidates, 83 DicK. L. REv. 387, 390-401 (1978) (describing state
interests in promoting the two-party system, assuring a majority winner, restricting the
ballot to serious candidates, preventing voter confusion and apathy, and furthering
administrative feasibility); James S. Jardine, Ballot Access Rights: The Constitutional
Status of the Right to Run for Offc 1974 UTAH L. REv. 290, 303-07 (identifying state
interests in maintaining integrity of the ballot, preventing voter confusion, ensuring
competent candidacies, and providing for administrative convenience); Note, supra
note 3, at 1136-39 (discussing the importance of the state interests in preserving the
two-party system and channeling factionalism into established parties).
I4 Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
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comes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade impor-
tant constitutional restraints. "28-
In essence, the Court has permitted state electoral regulations
that prevent elections from degenerating into "only the cacophony
of an atomized body politic, not the orchestrated voice of an elec-
torate."28 The following discussion will briefly summarize the
major state interests.
a. Political Stability
The Court has consistently recognized a number of states'
compelling interests under the rubric of maintaining the stability of
the political system.287 This interest is based on a fundamental
belief that "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do
significant damage to the fabric of government."288 Therefore, re-
straining intraparty and interparty competition may validly further
the goal of political stability.
A state's interest in limiting intraparty competition is effectuated
by limiting "sore-loser" candidacies.8 9 Consequently, the Court in
Storer found that the state election code's preclusion of "sore-loser"
candidacies was constitutional, concluding that "It]he general
election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum for
continuing intraparty feuds.
290
In addition, states have a valid interest in protecting against
destructive forms of interparty feuding. Thus, states may enact
legislation to eliminate interparty raiding which is generally defined
as "the organized switching of blocs of voters from one party to
21 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1869 (1995).
2 TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1097.
287 See Storer, 415 U.S. at 736 (recognizing "the State's interest in the stability of its
political system" and "considerfing] that interest as not only permissible, but compel-
ling").
2WS Id.
See, e.g., id. at 735; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 783 (1983); Patriot
Party v. Allegheny County Dep't of Elections, 95 F3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 1996). A sore-
loser candidacy is one in which an individual loses in a party primary and then seeks
to run as an independent or as a minor party candidate. See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S.
at 783 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.04 (Supp. 1982)).
o Storer, 415 U.S. at 735; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992)
(finding that a state's prohibition of write-in voting is a legitimate means of averting
sore-loser candidacies); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986)
(recognizing the state's interest in seeking to curtail the raiding of one party's primary
by voters sympathetic to the other party); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S.
189, 196 (1986) (holding that states may condition ballot access on a showing of a
modicum of voter support).
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another in order to manipulate the outcome of the other party's
primary election." '91
Perhaps the state interest that will become the most controversial
in future challenges to access restrictions is the preservation of the
two party system. The Court in Williams v. Rhode 92 rejected Ohio's
election scheme as a mechanism designed to entrench the two
existing parties, finding that the ballot access laws granted the major
parties a permanent monopoly in the electoral system. 293 However,
the Court stated that "the Ohio system does not merely favor a 'two-
party system'; it favors two particular parties.., and in effect tends
to give them a complete monopoly."294 Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that the Court in Williams accepted that a state might have a
legitimate interest in maintaining the viability of the two party
system, but that Ohio's regulation was simply overdrawn.295
291 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89 n.9; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439.
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
See id. at 32; discussion supra Part II.A (observing that the Ohio election code
required any new political party desiring to be placed on the ballot to file petitions
signed by qualified electors totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the
preceding election, and also imposed excessive party organizational requirements).
Id. (emphasis added).
25 But see Note, supra note 3, at 1138 (suggesting that the Court in Williams
"identified but dismissed" the state's interest in furthering a two-party system).
However, the author asserted that "[i]t seems undeniable that the political stability
that a two-party system fosters, by encouraging 'a politics of coalition and accommoda-
tion rather than... ideological and charismatic fragmentation,' is a compelling state
interest" and concluded that the state's interest in the preservation of the two-party
system is "[bly far [one of the] most important state interests." Id. (quoting BICKEL,
supra note 277, at 21-22)).
Scholars have viewed political parties as cohesive influences in an otherwise
decentralized structure of government. See, e.g., EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICAL
INFLUENCE 237 (1961) (observing that "[bjy far the most important mechanism
through which... formal decentralization is... overcome by informal centralization
... is the political party"); EDWARD C. BANFIELD &JAMES A. WILSON, CITY POLITICS
101 ("In order for anything to be done under pubic auspices, the elaborate
decentralization of authority.., must somehow be overcome. .. ."). The Framers
essentially created a formally decentralized system that would require the ad hoc
centralization of authority and power in order to effectively govern society. Political
parties are thus a significant factor in enabling the American government to function.
But see Michael Fitts & Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Preddential Influence in
Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737, 1741 (1992) (observing that in addition to its
"institutional decentralization... Congress today lacks strong political parties as an
alternative, informal, centralizing force"). Additionally, the desire to retain power on
a long-term basis forces political parties to act more responsibly than individuals might
otherwise. Finally, political parties have a more comprehensive view of society and
posterity, and thus act in a more holistic and forward-looking manner than individual
politicians. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information As a
Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 920-23 (1990)
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b. Political Legitimacy
The Court has also recognized the "substantial state interest...
in attempting to ensure that the election winner will represent a
[hereinafter Fitts, Ignorance] (arguing that in some circumstances, relying on strong,
centralized political institutions to disseminate information to the public can have
potential policy effects); Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes
on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1656-57 (1988) ("[P]olitical parties serve to
centralize authority, creating large scale institutions that attract diffuse majority
support and overcome some of the collective action problems in popular political
organization as well as government administration."); Michael A. Fitts, The res of
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1567, 1603 (1988) (arguing that "centralized political systems are thought
to enhance majority rule, reduce collective action problems, and improve the
operation of the decisional processes"); id. at 1628-29 (providing a historical
discussion of the decentralized power structure in Congress and the decline of
political parties).
For a more complete discussion of the value of the two-party system, see BICKEL,
supra note 277, at 22 (stating that "the dominance of [the] two major parties enables
us to achieve a politics of coalition and accommodation rather than of ideological and
charismatic fragmentation, governments that are moderate, and a regime that is
stable"). Bickel notes that a two-party system "tend[s] to ensure that there are few
irreconcilable losers, and that the winners can govern, even though-or perhaps
because-there are equally few total victories." Id.; see also Zywicki, supra note 63, at
139 (advocating a reduction in the interference -of federal courts in the review of state
ballot access laws).
In addition, other scholars have noted that as voters have become increasingly
less committed to the two major parties, the states' interest in encouraging the two
party system has become "quite substantial." Terry Smith, Election Law: Election Laws
and First Amendment Freedoms-Confusion and Clarification by the Supreme Court, 1988
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 597, 611-12.
Finally, although the Constitution does not address the phenomenon of political
parties in any sense, political organizations were certainly no mystery to the men who
attended the Constitutional Convention in 1787. In perhaps the most famous of the
Federalist Papers, Federalist Number 10, James Madison discussed the issue of
"factions" with the New York populace, stating that "[t] he latent causes of faction are
thus sown in the nature of man." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison noted that "the causes of faction cannot be
removed and the relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects."
Id. Madison also observed that, as factions were unavoidable in a representative
democracy and were also necessary to provide informal cohesion, the regulation of
"factions" would be a principle task of government action. For further discussion of
Madison's views of factions, see Stephen G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating
Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1479, 1485 (1994) (observing that Madison "hated and
feared factions").
For a brief discussion and rationale of why the United States political system
evolved into a two-party system, see BOTT, supra note 3, at 88-93.
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majority of the community."2 9  In his dissent in Williams, Justice
Stewart observed that:
Ohio's provisions tend to guard against the possibility that small-
party candidates will draw enough support to prevent either of the
major contenders from obtaining an absolute majority of votes-
and against the consequent possibility that election may be secured
by candidates who gain a plurality but who are, vis-a-vis their
principal opponents, preferred by less than half of those voting....
[I] t is inconceivable to me that the Constitution imposes on the
States a political philosophy under which they must be satisfied to
award election on the basis of a plurality rather than a majority
vote.
297
c. Avoiding Voter Confusion
Finally, the Court has recognized the states' interest in ensuring
that a voter's decision will be a rational and informed one. Conse-
quently, the Court has acknowledged that "'a State has an interest,
if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from
frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.' 298  States have legitimate
11 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32
(1968)); see also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
185 (1979) (discussing the Court's previous recognition of the states' interest in
limiting the number of candidates on the ballot); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145
(1972) (discussing the legitimate state interest in making sure that a winning
candidate is the choice of a majority or strong plurality of voters).
I9 Williams, 393 U.S. at 53-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Zywicki, supra note
63, at 122-23. In contrast, the federal system allows candidates who secure less than
a majority of the popular vote to win the presidency. See BoTT, supra note 3, at 87-88
("The Twelfth Amendment ... provide[s] that votes be cast separately for the
president and vice president. ... [T]he person receiving the highest number of
electoral votes cast for the presidency is president, and the person receiving the
highest number of votes cast for the vice presidency is vice president."). Three times
in American history "a person who received the majority of the popular vote did not
receive the majority of electoral votes and therefore did not become president." Id.
at 88 (Andrew Jackson (1824), Samuel Tilden (1876), Grover Cleveland (1888)).
Conversely, it is possible for a person who receives less than a majority of the popular
vote to become president. This happened in 1992, when Bill Clinton received more
votes than either then-President George Bush or Ross Perot, but did not receive a
majority. See Charles Krauthammer, Modest Election, Personal Defeat, WASH. POST, Nov.
7, 1992, at A21 (noting that President Clinton's 1992 win, with only 43% of the
popular vote, was the lowest percentage captured by a successful presidential
candidate since 1860). In 1996, President Clinton received more votes than either
Robert Dole or Ross Perot but again did not receive a majority.
25s Storer, 415 U.S. at 733 (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145).
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interests in "'prevent[ing] the clogging of... election machinery,
avoid[ing] voter confusion ... [and] avoiding overcrowded bal-
lots."' 9 These interests have been found on numerous occasions
to justify state ballot access regulations that require a "preliminary
showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the
name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot.""00
C. Indication of Court's Present View
As discussed in Part III, the Supreme Court's most recent discus-
sion on ballot access restrictions was U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorn-
ton.30a In determining that an amendment to the Arkansas Consti-
tution that precluded persons who had served a certain number of
terms in the U.S. Congress from having their names placed on the
ballot was unconstitutional, the Court rested its decision on a finding
that the U.S. Constitution prohibited states from imposing additional
congressional qualifications."0 2 Nevertheless, because the amend-
ment had been articulated as a ballot access restriction, the Court
found occasion to address its "Elections Clause cases." 03 The
Court held that "the Elections Clause [was intended] to grant States
[the] authority to create procedural regulations, not to provide States
with license to exclude classes of candidates from federal office."
304
To emphasize the procedural focus of the Elections Clause, the
Court quoted James Madison, stating that the Clause dealt with
"' [w] hether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should
assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts
or all meet at one place, sh[oul]d all vote for all the representatives;
or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district."'305
The Court in U.S. Term Limits concluded that:
The Elections Clause gives States authority "to enact the numerous
requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience
shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right
involved." However, "[t]he power to regulate the time, place, and
Id. at 732-33 (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145).3 0 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
0' See discussion supra Part III.C; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115
S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
S2 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1845, 1871.
303 Id. at 1870.
'04 Id. at 1869.
" Id. (citation omitted).
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manner of elections does notjustify, without more, the abridgement
of fundamental rights."
30 6
In essence, the Court's opinion states that ballot access restrictions
should be purely functional in character. Nevertheless, because the
Court's statements in U.S. Term Limits concerning access restrictions
were as cryptic as its previous jurisprudence, this issue remains far
from resolved. The Court's reference to "without more" may
indicate that compelling state interests, such as those discussed
above, will allow for more burdensome election schemes. Alterna-
tively, the Court may have intended that only some state interests, in
addition to and apart from traditional interests in regulating the
ballot, will suffice to uphold the constitutionality of burdensome
ballot access restrictions. This view is substantiated by the Court's
conclusion that:
The provisions at issue in Storer and our other Elections Clause
cases were thus constitutional because they regulated election proce-
dures and did not even arguably impose any substantive qualification
rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot
position. They served the state interest in protecting the integrity
and regularity of the election process.
07
Thus, it is possible that in the future the Court will recognize only
procedural rationales as sufficient justifications for restrictive ballot
access schemes.
However, in declaring that the "Elections Clause gives States
authority to '... enforce the fundamental right involved,"' the Court
may have suggested that procedural regulation of the electoral
process was a fundamental right of the state and hence a "compel-
ling" state objective. 308 Thus, U.S. Term Limits may imply that re-
strictive state ballot access regimes could survive strict scrutiny if they
further procedural objectives.
'0' Id. at 1869-70 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) and Tashjian
v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) respectively) (alteration in original,
emphasis added) (citation omitted).
30 Id. at 1870.
"I Id. at 1869 (quoting Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366) (omission in original).
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CONCLUSION
The United States appears to be entering a period marked by
significant upheaval in the political landscape.80 9 Persistent skepti-
cism of the "existing order" has taken the form of challenges to
incumbents and party-supported candidates by "outside" candi-
dates,"'0 third party candidates, and increasing support for a viable
third party. As these political forces attempt to effectuate change in
American society via the governmental structure, they confront
complex state election machinery that hinders, and often precludes,
their ballot access. Increasingly, these political upstarts have chal-
lenged the restrictive ballot access laws in the courts. As the popular
desire for alternative political choices escalates, so too will the
number of legal challenges.
This Comment illustrated the lack of clarity and the inconsistency
of the Supreme Court's historical jurisprudence in the area of state
ballot access restrictions, which has left lower courts confused as to
the proper method of analysis. This situation should be remedied
quickly. In fact, because of the increasing frequency of legal chal-
lenges accompanying minority and third party challenges to Republi-
cans and Democrats at the ballot,"' the Supreme Court will likely
decide a ballot access restriction case shortly.
This Comment argues that as a remedy, ballot access restrictions
must be examined through the tiered scrutiny analysis utilized by the
Court in traditional equal protection and substantive due process
challenges. Access restrictions necessarily implicate the freedom of
political association and the right to vote, both of which the Court
has accepted without question, to be fundamental in character. As
strict scrutiny was created to protect fundamental rights, it is logically
inconsistent and intuitively unreasonable for the Court to deny this
heightened scrutiny to two of our "most precious freedoms.""1 2
Therefore, the Court should employ a strict scrutiny analysis that
recognizes the fundamental nature of the individual rights infringed
and enables states to regulate effectively the elections process. Such
an analysis must recognize states' interests in maintaining political
stability, promoting political legitimacy, and avoiding voter confu-
o See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
310 For example, Patrick Buchanan challenged then-President George Bush in the
Republican primary process for the party's nomination in the 1992 presidential
election.
s" See supra Part IV.
312 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
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sion. Significantly, the Court must acknowledge that states do have
a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining a two-party
system, but also must prevent states from entrenching the two
existing parties in their positions of power. The Court should strike
a balance between the competing values of pure democracy and
governability-creating a ballot access regime that allows for change
in the substance of political ideology, but protects the formal and
informal governmental structures that enable our government to
function. Having entered the "political thicket" in 1968, the Court
should now establish order in the area of ballot access restrictions by
constructing a jurisprudential framework that will provide consisten-
cy, fairness and administrability. Our "most precious freedoms" may
depend on it."'
313 Id.
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